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PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE OF
AT WILL EMPLOYEES
JANE P. MALLOR*
Once a rarely invoked means of condemning outrageous conduct,
the doctrine of punitive damages' has become one of the primary
tools courts use to enlarge the accountability of those who hold
power over the welfare of the community. Because of the marked
rise in the size and incidence of punitive damages awards in recent
years,2 the doctrine has come to play an increasingly important
role in modern settlement negotiations and trial practice.3 The
doctrine also has been the subject of extensive analysis by courts4
and commentators.
5
* Associate Professor of Business Law, Indiana University School of Business. B.A. 1971,
Indiana University; J.D. 1976, Indiana University School of Law.
1. Punitive or exemplary damages are imposed on a defendant as an item of damages
apart from any compensatory remedy to punish him for malicious, wanton, oppressive, or
reckless conduct and to deter him and others from committing such conduct in the future.
D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 3.9, at 204-06 (1973); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACrS
§ 908 (1979).
All but four states-Louisiana, Nebraska, Massachusetts, and Washington-permit the
imposition of punitive damages in some form. See Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive
Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 8 n.38 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages].
2. See Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
1, 2 n.6 (1982); Priest, Punitive Damages and Enterprise Liability, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 123
(1982); Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69
VA. L. REV. 269, 271 n.6 (1983).
3. See, e.g., Gordon & Crowley, Defending the Punitive Damages Claim, 49 INs. Co. J.
300, 307-08 (1982).
4. The Supreme Court decided a number of cases involving punitive damages in recent
years. See, e.g. Silkwood v. Kerr McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984) (award of punitive
damages against federally licensed nuclear facility for violation of Oklahoma tort law not
preempted by federal law); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (punitive damages available
in appropriate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S.
247 (1981) (punitive damages may not be imposed against municipality in § 1983 actions);
IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979) (punitive damages may not be imposed on a union for
breach of its duty of fair representation).
5. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 2; Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Princi-
pled Approach, 31 HASTINGS L. J. 639 (1980); Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44
HARv. L. REV. 1173 (1931); Owen, Civil Punishment and the Public Good, 56 S. CAL. L. REv.
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The increased incidence of punitive damages awards is due in
part to judicial expansion of the circumstances under which puni-
tive damages are available. Courts have expanded the applicability
of the remedy to include cases involving wrongs as diverse as viola-
tions of civil rights,' sales of defective products,7 bad faith
breaches of contract,8 violations of state security laws,9 and
breaches of extracontractual duties by landlords.10
103 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Owen, Civil Punishment]; Owen, Problems in Assessing
Punitive Damages, supra note 1; Owen, Punitive Damages in Product Liability Litigation,
74 MicH. L. REv. 1257 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Owen, Punitive Damages]; Priest, supra
note 2; Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Damages, A
Comment 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 133 (1982); Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract:
The Reality and the Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REv. 207 (1977); see Wheller,
supra note 2.
6. See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 233-34 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); Merritt v. De Los Santos, 721 F.2d 598 (7th
Cir. 1983); Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1978); Fountila v. Carter, 571 F.2d 487 (9th
Cir. 1978). But see La Reau v. Manson, 383 F. Supp. 214, 219 (D. Conn. 1974). See gener-
ally Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983); Note, Civil Rights-42 U.S.C. § 1983-Puni-
tive Damages are Available under Section 1983 when the Defendant's Conduct Involves
Reckless or Callous Indifference of the Plaintiff's Federally Protected Rights, 13 U. BALT.
L. REV. 187 (1983).
7. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981);
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980); Owen, Problems in
Assessing Punitive Damages, supra note 1; Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 5; Seltzer,
Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness, Effi-
ciency, and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 37 (1983); Snyman, The Validity of Punitive
Damages in Products Liability Cases, 44 INs. Co. J. 402 (1979); Note, Punitive Damages in
Strict Products Liability Litigation, 23 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 333 (1981).
8. See, e.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 482, appeal dismissed, 445 U.S. 912 (1979); Jones v. Abriani, 350 N.E.2d 635 (Ind.
App. 1976). See generally Sullivan, supra note 5; Note, The Expanding Availability of Pu-
nitive Damages in Contract Actions, 8 IND. L. REv. 668 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Punitive Damages in Contract Actions]; Note, Punitive Damages in Contract Actions-Are
the Exceptions Swallowing the Rule?, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 86 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Punitive Damages Exceptions].
9. See Anvil Inv. Ltd. Partnership v. Thornhill Condominiums, 85 Ill. App. 3d 1108, 407
N.E.2d 645 (1980); cf. Stowell v. Ted S. Finkel Inv. Serv. Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D. Fla.
1980) (punitive damages not available for violation of state security statute, but are availa-
ble for accompanying common law fraud). See generally Comment, Punitive Damages and
the Federal Securities Act: Recovery Via Pendent Jurisdiction, 47 Miss. L.J. 743, 759-65,
767 (1976).
10. Kipsborough Realty Corp. v. Goldbetter, 367 N.Y.S.2d 916 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1975)
(breach of warranty of habitability); Brewer v. Erwin, 61 Or. App. 642, 658 P.2d 1180 (1983)
(violation of Oregon Residential Landlord and Tenant Act); cf. Hall v. Consolidated Edison
Corp., 104 Misc. 2d 565, 428 N.Y.S.2d 837 (N.Y. Supp. Ct. 1980) (punitive damages permit-
ted in action by tenant against electric utility for wrongful disconnection of electricity that
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One context in which the application of a punitive remedy is
particularly controversial is the new and rapidly expanding area of
law granting rights of action for the wrongful discharge of employ-
ees whose job security is not guaranteed by express contract, col-
lective bargaining agreement, statutory provision or tenure system.
Such employees comprise the majority of the American workforce",
and commonly are called "at will" employees because traditional
legal principles hold that their employment is terminable at will.
The creation of a remedy for wrongfully discharged at will em-
ployees is in itself one of the most dramatic legal developments of
the past decade.12 Before that time, an employer in virtually all
cases could discharge an at will employee without notice for almost
any reason.13 While the termination at will rule often worked harsh
results,"4 it promoted economic growth by according business own-
resulted in injury from fall on unlighted stairway).
11. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 322 n.6, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 921
n.6 (1981) (less than 28% of the nonagricultural workforce are employed under terms of a
union agreement); Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The
Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1816 n.2 (1980) (60-65% of the
American workforce governed by employment at will rule).
12. Numerous law review articles examine the development of this cause of action. See,
e.g., Blades, Employment At Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise
of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967); Friedman, Exposed Nerves: Some
Thoughts on Our Changing Legal Culture, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 529, 544 (1983) (discussing
the social and historical factors that led to the emergence of this doctrine); Krauskopf, Em-
ployment Discharge: Survey and Critique of the Modern At Will Rule, 51 UMKC L. REV.
189 (1983); Murg & Scharman, Employment At Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the
Rule?, 23 B.C.L. REv. 329 (1983); Peirce, Mann & Roberts, Employee Termination at Will:
A Principled Approach, 28 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1982); Note, Protecting at Will Employees,
supra note 11; Note, Defining Public Policy Torts in At-Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. REV.
153 (1981).
13. The Supreme Court of Tennessee made a classic statement of the termination at will
rule in Payne v. Western & AtI. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), rev'd sub. nom.
Hutton v. Watlers, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915): "All may dismiss their employees at
will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong,
without being thereby guilty of legal wrong." See also Johnson v. B. & N. Steakhouse, 443
So. 2d 924 (Ala. 1983); Henry v. Pittsburg & L.E.R. Co., 139 Pa. 289, 21 A. 157 (1891). For
more complete compilation of cases approving the employment at will rule, see Employment
Coordinator (RIA) EP-22,681 n.3 (1984). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY
§ 442 (1957); 9 S. W LLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1017 at 129-30 (W. Jaeger ed. 1967).
14. See, e.g. Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So. 2d 594 (Ala. 1980) (plaintiff
discharged for serving on a grand jury had no right of action against employer); Comerford
v. International Harvester, 235 Ala. 376, 178 So. 894 (1938) (plaintiff had no cause of action
when discharged in revenge for supervisor's unsuccessful attempts to alienate affections of
plaintiff's wife); Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. App. 1977) (plaintiff had
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ers maximum control over the workplace. 15
Confronted with high levels of unemployment and an increas-
ingly wage-dependent population, however, courts began to ques-
tion some of the basic assumptions of the termination at will rule.
Concerns about protecting public interests inherent in the employ-
ment relationship and controlling the abuse of managerial power
have gradually eroded the at will rule through the enactment of
statutory restrictions and the creation of a private cause of action
for wrongfully discharged employees. At least twenty-nine jurisdic-
tions now recognize some form of this right of action.' The devel-
opment of a wrongful discharge action has proceeded at a cautious
pace, however, because courts are balancing important and subtle
countervailing interests. No singular theory of recovery is accepted
by all states, nor do the various state courts agree whether the ac-
tion lies in contract or tort.17
The applicability of punitive damages has been at issue in a
number of wrongful discharge cases, with predictably mixed re-
suts.' 8 No court has analyzed thoroughly the propriety of using a
punitive remedy in wrongful discharge cases, although the conjunc-
tion of these two expanding areas of law warrants careful analysis.
The imposition of punitive damages in wrongful discharge cases
could become, a powerful force for deterring the abuse of manage-
no cause of action when terminated after announcing intent to attend law school at night).
15. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 320, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 921 (1981);
see also Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 118, 133-34 (1976).
16. Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 896 (3d Cir. 1983). The table published
in Employment Coordinator (RIA) EP-22,684, at 82-685-86 (1984) illustrates the jurisdic-
tions recognizing exceptions to the at will rule and indicates the theories of recovery
recognized.
17. Compare Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Il. 2d 124, 129, 421 N.E.2d
876, 878-79 (1981) (wrongful discharge action sounds in tort) with Vandegrift v. American
Brands Corp., 572 F. Supp. 496, 499 (D.N.H. 1983) (wrongful discharge action a hybrid
between contract and tort) and Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 334
N.W.2d 834, 841 (1983) (wrongful discharge action based on violation of public policy is a
contract action).
18. Compare Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Service, Inc., 653 F.2d 1057, 1064 (5th Cir.
1981) (punitive damages not allowable) and Yartzoff v. Democrat-Herald Publishing Co.,
281 Or. 651, 576 P.2d 356, 360 n.1 (1978) (same) with Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 668
P.2d 213, 216 (Mont. 1983) (punitive damages approved) and Lally v. Copygraphics, 173
N.J. Super. 162, 169, 413 A.2d 960, 968-69 (1980) (same), aff'd, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981). See
infra notes 160-219 and accompanying text.
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rial discretion, or it could result in undue chilling of business deci-
sionmaking and lead to the retention of unproductive employees.
This Article evaluates whether public policy favors the use of
punitive damages in cases involving the wrongful discharge of at
will employees. The Article begins by tracing the development of
the wrongful discharge action and by discussing the various theo-
ries of recovery recognized by courts. Part Two examines the pur-
poses and the doctrinal contours of the punitive damages remedy
and evaluates the treatment of punitive damages in existing
wrongful discharge cases. Finally, in Part Three, the Article ana-
lyzes the policies that militate for and against the use of punitive
damages in such cases and proposes guidelines for an accommoda-
tion of those policies.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RIGHTS OF ACTION FOR AT WILL
EMPLOYEES
A. Rise of the At Will Doctrine
The American' 9 rule that employment of uncertain duration is
terminable at will is in itself a relatively recent judicial creation.
The traditional English rule, premised on a view of employment as
a status-based relationship replete with customary rights and du-
ties,1° presumed that employment of unspecified duration was for a
term of one year2 1 and could not be terminated during that time
without just cause or reasonable notice.22 Prior to the middle of the
19. See Peirce, Mann & Roberts, supra note 12, at 15-19 (contrasting American law re-
garding termination of employment with that of other industrialized democracies).
20. See P. SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 123-31 (1969) (contains an
excellent discussion of the characteristics of the traditional English law of master and
servant).
21. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 320, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 921 (1981);
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 567, -, 334 N.W.2d 834, 837 (1983). For a
detailed treatment of English law regarding employment termination, see Feinman, supra
note 15, at 119-22.
22. [I]f the hiring be general without any particular time limited, the law construes
it to be a hiring for a year; . . . and no master can put away his servant, or
servant leave his master, after being so retained, either before or at the end of
this term, without a quarter's warning; unless upon reasonable cause to be al-
lowed by a justice of the peace, but they may part by consent, or make a spe-
cial bargain.
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 425-26 (5th ed. 1872); see also
Feinman, supra note 15, at 121.
19851
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nineteenth century, American courts appear to have followed the
English rule.2 3 In the latter half of the nineteenth century, how-
ever, fueled by the rise of industrial capitalism and emerging no-
tions of freedom of contract, American courts repudiated the Eng-
lish rule in favor of a contract-based approach to the problem.24
This approach emphasized the parties' freedom (or obligation) to
define their own relationship.2 5 The new rule presumed that either
party could terminate the employment relationship absent express
agreement to the contrary.
26
By the turn of the century, the at will rule was solidly en-
trenched in American law. This policy of nonintervention was
and sometimes still is justified by .a formalistic approach to the
doctrine of consideration. Courts reason that because at will em-
ployees are free to quit at any time, the creation of a right to con-
tinued employment would destroy mutuality of obligation. 28 A
23. Feinman, supra note 15, at 122-29.
24. P. SELNICK, supra note 20, at 130-31.
25. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 319-20, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 921
(1981).
26. Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 628 (Hawaii 1982). Commentators
date the birth of the American employment at will rule to the publication of Horace Gray
Wood's 1877 treatise on the law of master and servant, which stated that "[a] general or
indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a
yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof." H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877); see Feinman, supra note 15, at 125-27; Note,
supra note 11, at 1825 n.51; Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L.
REV. 335, 341 (1974) (noting that Wood's declaration was unsupported by the cases he cited
as authority) [hereinafter cited as Note, Implied Contract].
For a thorough discussion of the development of the at will rule in the United States, see
Feinman, supra note 15, at 122-29: Note, Implied Contract, supra at 340-46.
27. Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, __, 335 N.W.2d 834, 837 (1983).
The power to terminate at will received constitutional protection for a time. See Coppage v
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (state statute outlawing contracts whereby employee agrees not to
join union held unconstitutional); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (federal stat-
ute barring dismissal of employees because of union membership held unconstitutional).
These cases subsequently were discredited. See Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern
Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1, 33 (1937); Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S.
548 (1930).
28. See, e.g., Jones v. Keogh, 409 A.2d 581, 582 (Vt. 1979); cf. Cleary v. American Airlines,
Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 448-49, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 725 (1980) (noting that the require-
ment of mutuality of obligation is the basis for the employment at will rule). But see Pine
River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn. 1983) (mutuality is "[s]imply a
species of the forbidden inquiry into the adequacy of consideration"); Weiner v. McGraw-
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more convincing explanation is that courts adopted the termina-
tion at will rule because it dovetailed with prevailing ideological
convictions and economic needs. 9
Whatever its purported justification, the at will doctrine granted
to employers absolute sovereignty over the workplace. The right to
discharge employees at will effectively deprived employees of bar-
gaining power in negotiations for wages, rules, and conditions of
the workplace.30 It also shifted to employees the risks of distur-
bances in the business cycle." Perhaps most important, the doc-
trine gave employers maximum flexibility to select and retain em-
ployees who best furthered their objectives3 2 and to discharge
easily unproductive or troublesome employees.
As the number of employees in the workforce increased and the
power of large corporations became secure, however, Congress and
state legislatures responded to the shifting balance of political
power and the need for stability in labor relations3 3 by enacting
statutes promoting collective bargaining. These statutes limited
management's ability to terminate most employees covered by col-
lective bargaining agreements.3 4 Naturally, the strong federal com-
mitment to collective bargaining does little to facilitate job secur-
ity for the vast majority of American workers who cannot or do not
belong to unions.
Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, -, 443 N.E.2d 441, 444 (1982) (mutuality in the sense of reci-
procity not required when promisor receives other valid consideration).
29. See Note, Implied Contract, supra note 26, at 343.
30. Feinman supra note 15, at 132-33; see also P. SELZNICK, supra note 20, at 134-37
(noting that the contract of employment becomes "a mode of submission, if provision is not
made for employee participation in the continuing process of rule-making and administra-
tion") (emphasis in original).
The employer's unfettered -liscretion to hire and fire was an important reason for the rise
of labor unions. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 320, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917,
921 n.5 (1981); see also Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Em-
ployee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1448 (1975).
31. See Feinman, supra note 15, at 133-34.
32. Percival v. General Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1126, 1130 (8th Cir. 1976) (large corpora-
tion must be accorded wide latitude in determining whom to hire for sensitive managerial
position).
33. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 67, 417 A.2d 505, 509 (1980).
34. Approximately 80% of collective bargaining agreements require just cause for dismis-
sal. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 320-21 n.5, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 921 n.5
(1981) (citing Peck, Unjust Discharge from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law,
40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 8 (1979)).
1985]
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More widely applicable restraints on an employer's power to ter-
minate were achieved by the enactment of state and federal stat-
utes outlawing discharges for specified reasons, such as discrimina-
tion, 5 absence because of jury service,36 garnishment of wages,
filing workers' compensation claims,38 and refusing to submit to
polygraph examinations.3 9 These diverse statutes reflect a common
concern that employers' power of termination should not subvert
important public policies.
This same concern, together with changing philosophies of con-
tract law, stimulated a period of judicial initiative in the mid-
1970's, unparalleled in employment law since the development of
the at will rule itself, that resulted in the development of private
rights of action for wrongfully discharged at will employees. Courts
recognize three distinct formulations of a private-damage remedy
for wrongfully discharged at will employees: breach of implied-in-
fact contract, violation of public policy, and breach of implied cov-
enant of good faith and fair dealing.
B. Theories of Recovery
1. Breach of Implied-in-Fact Contract
Because the termination at will rule was derived from the par-
ties' lack of express consent to be bound for a term, courts quickly
began to enforce employers' assurances that employment would be
terminated only for cause. For example, in Toussaint v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield,40 the Michigan Supreme Court found that an em-
ployer had bound itself contractually not to discharge the plaintiff
except for just cause because the employer had told the plaintiff
when it hired him that he would be with the company "as long as
35. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1981) (prohibiting discrimination because or race,
color, sex, religion, or national origin).
36. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 756.25(1) (1981); see also [1980] LAB. L. REP. (CCH) (State
Laws) 1 43,035 (listing statutes).
37. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1982); Wis. STAT. § 812.235 (1977).
38. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 659.410 (1981); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307(c)
(Vernon Supp. 1984).
39. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7321(a) (Purdon 1983); see also Herman, Privacy,
The Prospective Employee, and Employment Testing: The Need to Restrict Polygraph
and Personality Testing, 47 WASH. L. REV. 73, 97-102 (1971).
40. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
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he did his job."'"
Integrating employer assurances into the contract requires modi-
fication of the traditional rule that promises of continued employ-
ment require independent consideration to be binding.42 A frontal
assault on the at will rule, however, is unnecessary. The implied-
in-fact contract approach merely permits courts to adjudicate con-
sistently with a traditional contract principle: protect the parties'
manifest expectations. In a number of cases, as in Toussaint, the
employees derived their expectations from express verbal assur-
ances of continued employment or of dismissal only for just
cause.43 In other cases, employees derived expectations from em-
41. Id. at 581-82, 292 N.W.2d at 891.
42. See Note, Implied Contract, supra note 26, at 351-52 ("In terms of 19th-century con-
tract law, employees exchanged their labor and services for the salary they earned. If they
wanted added job security, they had to pay the employer additional consideration to make
the arrangement mutual and binding."). This view still exists in some jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
Page v. Carolina Coach Co., 667 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying Maryland Law); Ohio
Table Pad Co. of Indiana v. Hogan, 424 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. App. 1981); Roberts v. Atlan-
tic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 895, 568 P.2d 764, 769 (1977).
The rule has been roundly criticized as being an incorrect analysis of consideration doc-
trine and a number of courts have rejected this rule. See, e.g., Scholtes v. Signal Delivery
Serv., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 487, 492-93 (W.D. Ark. 1982); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal.
App. 3d 311, 326, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925 (1981) (independent consideration a rule of con-
struction, not of substance); see also Note, Implied Contract, supra note 26, at 351-56; cf.
Yartzoff v. Democrat-Herald Publishing Co., 28 Or. 651, 657, 576 P.2d 356, 359 (1978) (con-
sideration to support post-employment handbook assurances of continued employment sup-
plied by fact that employee had the right to quit but did not); Pine River State Bank v.
Mettile, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn. 1983).
43. See Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Serv., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Ark. 1982); Peters
v. Alabama Power Co., 440 So.2d 1028 (Ala. 1983); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App.
3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981); Shah v. American Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d
489 (Ky. 1983); Stone v. Mission Bay Mortgage Co., 672 P.2d 629 (Nev. 1983); Weiner v.
Mcgraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441 (1982).
In some of these cases, parties asserted the statute of frauds as a defense. Because New
York's Statute of Frauds requires written evidence of contracts for a lifetime, N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. § 5-701(a)(1) (McKinney 1978), courts applying New York law have held that claims
of oral assurances of employment for the remainder of a career are unenforceable under the
Statute of Frauds. See McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108, 1116 (D.
Mass. 1980) (applying New York law because of a choice-of-law clause in the employment
contract); Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822, 824 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). In jurisdic-
tions applying other states' laws, courts have rejected the statute of frauds defense because
the contract could be performed within a year. See Frazier v. Colonial Williamsburg Found.,
574 F. Supp. 318, 320 (E.D. Va. 1983); Stone v. Mission Bay Mortgage Co., 672 P.2d at 630-
31. In Mayer v. King Cola of Mid American Inc., 660 S.W.2d 746 (Mo. App. 1983), an oral
contract of employment for a three-year term was held unenforceable under the statute of
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ployment manuals, policies, or handbooks unilaterally developed,
published, and distributed by employers.""
Although the implied contract approach is a step in the direction
of satisfying employees' expectations, it may be a fleeting solution
only. As employers-particularly the larger and more sophisticated
employers-receive legal advice about this source of potential lia-
bility, they are likely to insert disclaimers about job security in
their personnel literature and instruct their recruiting staff to re-
frain from giving any verbal assurances that the company will ter-
minate employees only for cause.4 5 Even in the absence of explicit
frauds.
44. See, e.g., Wiskeotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983); Fra-
zier v. Colonial Williamsburg Found., 574 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Va. 1983); Wagner v. Sperry
Univac., 458 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Osterkamp v. Alkota Mfg., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 275
(S.D. 1983). Some employees have been permitted to maintain their implied contract ac-
tions in cases in which personnel manuals, handbooks, and policies were published or dis-
tributed after employment had begun. See, e.g., Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333
N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); Yartzoff v. Democrat-Herald Publishing Co., Inc., 281 Or. 651,
576 P.2d 356 (1978). But see Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d
779 (1976) (post-employment manual did not create contract rights in employee); Gates v.
Life of Montana Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Mont. 1982) (post-employment handbook
assurances did not create implied contract but were treated as relevant to the ultimate find-
ing of an implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
Some courts have rejected the notion that published statements of employer policies cre-
ate implied contract rights. See Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395 (Tenn. App.
1981) (handbook did not entitle plaintiff to any specific term); Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Men-
doza, 644 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. App. 1982) (policies published in handbook state general guide-
lines and do not create agreement because employer can unilaterally amend or withdraw
contract).
45. In Batchelor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3467 (E.D. Mich. 1983),
the plaintiff signed an application for employment that contained a term expressly stating
that the employer had the right to discharge at will. The court held that the provision be-
came part of the employer's offer and thus part of the contract when plaintiff accepted it.
Id. at 3470. The court noted that the disclaimer was a policy statement of the employer and
that if a statement of policy can bind the employer to an implied contract, as in Toussaint,
it also should be possible for an employer to protect itself by a statement of policy. Id. If the
statement is uncontradicted by other assurances, the court concluded that it would preclude
the development of expectations that the employer would discharge only for cause. Id. at
3471.
In two cases in which the disclaimer of job security was alleged to have been controverted
by contrary assurances, plaintiffs' claims survived summary judgment. In Stone v. Mission
Bay Mortgage Co., 672 P.2d 629 (Nev. 1983), a statement on an application for employment
that the employment was for no definite period and might be terminated at any time with-
out notice did not necessarily preclude the employee from proving the existence of an oral
contract for one year. The court noted that the application was for informational purposes
and that the parties should have the opportunity to prove whether it was intended to be-
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assurances of discharge only for just cause, it seems unrealistic to
presume that employees do not develop expectations of some job
security.
46
2. Discharge in Violation of Public Policy
A second exception to the at will rule makes employers account-
able, generally in tort,47 for discharging an employee for a reason
that contravenes public policy. To maintain such an action, the
discharged employee must prove a connection between the reason
for his termination and an acknowledged public policy other than
the general policy favoring employment and stability in labor rela-
tions.48 Like the statutory restrictions on discharge, this approach
focuses on enforcing independent public policies that conflict with
parties' employment relationships.4" Only incidentally are the em-
ployee's interests furthered. 0
The "Achilles heel" of the public policy exception is the impreci-
come part of their contract. Id. at 630; see also Arie v. Intertuerm, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142
(Mo. App. 1983).
46. See Note, supra note 11, at 1831-32 (noting that employees frequently fail to bargain
for job security because, lacking information, they discount risk of wrongful discharge).
47. E.g., Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983) (applying Pa. law);
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 IlM. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981); Hansen v.
Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394 (Nev. 1984). But see Vigil v. Arzola, 22 NM. ST. B. BuLL 868, 874
(1983); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, ., 335 N.W.2d 834, 841 (1983)
(only contract remedies available).
The use of more traditional tort causes of action in wrongful discharge cases is controver-
sial. Compare Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976) (employee
had an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress) with Murphy v. American
Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 303, 448 N.E.2d 86, 90, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 236 (1983) (no
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, which would evade court's refusal to
recognize cause of action for wrongful discharge) and Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 620 P.2d
699, 703 (Ariz. App. 1980) (no recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress be-
cause termination was lawful). See Krauskopf, supra note 12, at 223-32 (discussing recovery
under traditional theories of intentional infliction of emotional distress, interference with
prospective advantage, and prima facie tort).
48. Cloutier v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 436 A.2d 1140, 1143 (N.H. 1981); Pierce
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980).
49. See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 IM. 2d 124, 133, 421 N.E.2d 876, 880
(1981) ("The foundation of the tort of retaliatory discharge lies in the protection of public
policy .... "); Note, supra note 12, at 158 (concluding that courts will not intervene unless
"the employer's conduct implicates something that the public has at stake. . .
50. See Krauskopf, supra note 12, at 235.
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sion inherent in the term "public policy." 51 A few courts have re-
jected the public policy theory altogether, out of discomfort with
the theory's imprecision or out of deference to legislative preroga-
tives.2 Most courts that have adopted the public policy theory re-
quire that the employee be able to point to "a clear mandate of
public policy" as expressed in existing law.5" Other courts define
public policy more narrowly, requiring that the policy exist in some
specific statutory or constitutional provision.5 4 Courts have been
51. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 130, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878
(1981).
52. See Johnson v. B & N Steakhouse, 443 So. 2d 924 (Ala. 1983); Hinrichs v. Tranqui-
laire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977); Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874
(Miss. 1981); Murphy v. American Home Prods., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983); Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272
(1978); Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395 (Tenn. App. 1981); Maus v. National
Living Centers, 633 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. App. 1982).
The at will doctrine also survived a public policy attack in two cases involving bank em-
ployees. Federal banking laws stating that banks shall have the right to dismiss employees
"at pleasure" were held to have preempted any state remedy. See Inglis v. Feinerman, 114
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3481 (9th Cir. 1983); Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 650
F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1981).
53. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980);
Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974); Brockmeyer v. Dun &
Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983); cf. Jones v. Keough, 137 Vt. 562, 409
A.2d 581 (1979) (court unwilling to recognize suits for wrongful discharge absent clear and
compelling public policy).
A few courts have employed a broad construction of public policy, rejecting the necessity
for an explicit statutory declaration. See Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d
Cir. 1983); Sheets v. .Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980);
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981); Petrik v.
Monarch Printing Co., 111 Ill. App. 3d 502, 444 N.E.2d 588 (1982); Cloutier v. Great Atlan-
tic & Pacific Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981).
The New Hampshire Supreme Court held the determination of public policy to be a
proper issue to submit to a jury. Cloutier v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 121 N.H. at
-, 436 A.2d at 1145. Contra, Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, -, 335
N.W.2d 834, 841 (1983).
54. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal. Rptr.
613 (1984); Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054 (Ind. App. 1980), transfer denied,
421 N.E.2d 1099 (Ind. 1981); Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l, Inc., 65 Or. App. 160, 670 P.2d 218
(1983), rev'd, 681 P.2d 114 (1984); Brockmeyer v. Dunn & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335
N.W.2d 834 (1983).
When the statutory policy is found in a statute that supplies its own remedies, however,
courts disagree about whether the statutory remedy precludes an independent action for
wrongful discharge. This question has arisen concerning the exclusivity of statutory reme-
dies for employment discrimination. Alternative actions for wrongful discharge are particu-
larly attractive to plaintiffs in such cases because of the short statutes of limitation and
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careful to distinguish matters implicating the public interest from
those "menial mendacities" 55 involved in purely private disputes.5 6
The standard used to restrain employers from violating the pub-
lic interest must meet two criteria that are not easily accommo-
dated. First, the standard must identify public interests that are
sufficiently important to override employers' interests in con-
ducting their business as they see fit. Second, courts must be able
to administer the standard with sufficient consistency to provide
predictable results. Articulating a standard that meets both crite-
ria has proved a challenging task for courts. An expansive concep-
tualization of public policy promotes just results by providing
courts with the ability to determine on a case-by-case basis
whether the policy involved is of sufficient importance to justify
limitations on the power of termination. Such an approach, how-
ever, threatens legitimate managerial discretion 57 because it gives
business owners little means of determining in advance whether a
given decision to terminate would be lawful. 8
A broad public policy exception also can result in high litigation
costs and the corresponding burden on judicial resources that often
attend nebulous causes of action.5 9 In addition, a case-by-case ap-
proach that eases the requirements for a prima facie showing may
limited damage remedies that are characteristic of statutory discrimination actions. Com-
pare Bruffett v. Warner Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1982) (statutory rem-
edy exclusive for discrimination on the basis of handicap) and Bachand v. Connecticut Gen.
Life Ins. Co., 101 Wis. 2d 617, 305 N.W.2d 149 (1981) (same) with Holien v. Sears, Roebuck
Co., 66 Or. App. 911, 677 P.2d 704 (1984) (statutory remedy for sex discrimination did not
preclude wrongful discharge action) and Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312
(9th Cir. 1982) (recovery under Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not preclude
action for wrongful discharge), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982). Cf. Frazier v. Colonial
Williamsburg Found. 574 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Va. 1983) (Title VII did not preclude em-
ployee's action for breach of implied contract); McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F.
Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980) (termination of plaintiff because of age violated implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing).
55. Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l, Inc., 65 Or. App. 160, 167, 670 P.2d 218, 222 (1983).
56. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 131, 421 N.E.2d 876, 879
(1981); Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811, 812 (Ky. App. 1977); Nees v. Hocks, 272
Or. 210, 218, 536 P.2d 512, 515 (1975).
57. See Percival v. General Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1126, 1130 (8th Cir. 1976); Pierce v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72, 417 A.2d 505, 51041 (1980).
58. Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate At Will-Have the Courts Forgotten the Em-
ployer?, 35 VAND. L. REv. 201, 226-28 (1982).
59. See Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 181, 319 A.2d 174, 179 (1974).
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promote vexatious lawsuits and large damage awards by permitting
employees with marginal claims to submit their cases to sympa-
thetic juries.6 0 Although important public policies exist that are
not stated expressly in constitutional or statutory provisions, cau-
tion about basing the wrongful discharge action on judicial declara-
tions of public policy"' is understandable.
The public policy cases can be viewed along a continuum. Plain-
tiffs are most likely to prevail when two factors are present: the
public policy is clear, that is, both specific and based on written
law, and the discharge presents a clear threat of frustrating that
policy. 2 Exemplifying the extreme on the continuum in which ju-
dicial intervention is most likely to occur are the cases in which
employees are discharged for refusing to commit an illegal act.6 3 In
the earliest public policy case, Petermann v. International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters,64 the California Supreme Court recognized a
cause of action for an employee dismissed after refusing to commit
perjury.65 Similarly, courts have recognized rights of action for em-
60. See Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); see also
Note, supra note 58, at 229.
61. See Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631 (Hawaii 1982) (courts should
proceed cautiously in declaring public policy in the absence of statute); Abrisz v. Pulley
Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454, 456 (Iowa 1978) (courts should not declare conduct
violative of public policy unless clearly so).
62. This analysis is suggested in Note, Guidelines for a Public Policy Exception to the
Employment At Will Rule: The Wrongful Discharge Tort, 13 CONN. L. REv. 617, 635-41
(1981). The author identifies substantiality of public policy and impact of the discharge on
public policy as the two major variables influencing courts in public policy cases. Id. at 622,
635.
63. Not every discharge for refusal to perform a "wrongful" act gives rise to a wrongful
discharge action. See Percival v. General Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1976) (plain-
tiff's termination for complaints about employer's practices and refusal to provide false in-
formation to government not actionable); Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So.2d 1130
(Ala. 1977) (no cause of action for employee discharged for refusing to falsify medical
records); Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983) (no cause of action for employee allegedly discharged for age, reporting
improper accounting practices and refusing to engage in accounting improprieties); Delaney
v. Taco Time Int'l Inc., 65 Or. App. 160, 670 P.2d 218 (1983) (reversing judgment for plain-
tiff discharged for refusing to sign a false statement about another employee's termination).
These results may be explained by the clarity factor. None of the plaintiffs in these cases
identified a specific statutory declaration outlawing the act which they were discharged for
refusing to perform. In Delaney, the court noted that no statute makes the signing of a false
statement illegal. Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l Inc., 650 Or. App. at 167, 670 P.2d at 221.
64. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
65. Id. at 190, 344 P.2d at 28.
462
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ployees discharged after refusing to participate in a price fixing
-scheme,66 refusing to perform a medical procedure for which she
was not licensed, 7 and refusing to falsify a state-required pollution
control report.6 s
In such cases involving a refusal to commit an illegal act, the
public policy stated in criminal and regulatory statutes is clear,
and a high degree of public interest exists in enforcing those stat-
utes. The public interest in enforcing the statute would be frus-
trated if an employee, forced to elect between losing his job or vio-
lating the law, chose the latter. The recognition of a private
remedy for wrongful discharge in such cases promotes obedience to
the law on the part of employees by removing the strong incentive
to disobedience (loss of employment) that would exist otherwise.
Other relatively clear examples of cases on this part of the con-
tinuum include cases in which employees are discharged for per-
forming a legal duty such as jury service,69 or for taking advantage
of some right granted by statute. Cases abound in which employees
have been granted a remedy when they were discharged for filing
workers' compensation claims.70 In two cases, employees were held
66. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1980).
No judicial consensus exists concerning whether an employee who is discharged for refus-
ing to violate antitrust laws has standing to sue her employer under section 4 of the Clayton
Act. Compare Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., Inc., 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982) (employee had
standing) with Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982) (employee did not
have standing), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983). See generally Note, Employee Stand-
ing Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1846 (1983). See also Krauskopf,
supra note 12, at 220-21.
67. O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super 416, 390 A.2d 149 (1978).
68. Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385
(1978).
69. Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc.,
255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978); cf. Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West, 716
F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff had case for wrongful discharge on implied contract and
public policy theories when discharged for appearing before grand jury, pursuant to sub-
poena, regarding a matter about which he was under suspicion). But see Bender Ship Re-
pair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So. 2d 594 (Ala. 1980) (employee had no cause of action when
discharged for serving on grand jury).
70. See, e.g., Smith v. Piezo Technology & Prof. Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983); Kel-
say v. Motorola, Inc., 74 M1. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 425 (1979); Franpton v. Central Indiana Gas
Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County Dep't
of Labor Servs., 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981); Firestone Textile Co. Div. v.
Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1983); Hansen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394 (Nev. 1984); Lally
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to have stated a cause of action when they were discharged in vio-
lation of a state law that prohibited employers from conditioning
employment on the taking of a polygraph examination. 1 De facto
frustration of the statutory objective would result if no private
remedy were available in such cases.
Occupying the middle range of the continuum are the "conscien-
tious objector" cases, in which employees are discharged for their
efforts to bring their employers into compliance with some law,
regulation, or code, and "whistleblower" cases,7 2 in which employ-
ees are discharged for alerting legal authorities or corporate man-
agement to incidents of wrongdoing by their companies or fellow
employees. Such cases are less deserving of judicial intervention
than are the first group of cases because the employee is dis-
charged for performing an act he has no duty or even a specific
legal right to perform. Nevertheless, a court in this type of case
may be tempted to sacrifice the certainty of the "clear public pol-
icy" rule for the flexibility of a more expansive approach.
In Palmateer v. International Harvester Co.,7 3 for example, an
employee was discharged for supplying information to police about
a fellow employee's possible involvement in a crime and for agree-
ing to assist in the investigation and trial if needed. The Illinois
Supreme Court defined public policy broadly as what is "right and
just and which affects the citizens of the State collectively. 71 4 The
court identified the public policy involved as the enforcement of
v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J. Super. 162, 413 A.2d 960 (1980); Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or.
597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978) (en banc); cf. Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Serv., Inc., 653 F.2d
1057 (5th Cir. 1981) (seaman discharged in retaliation for filing Jones Act claim has cause of
action under maritime law); Wiley v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 430 So.2d 1016 (La. App.
1982) (employee discharged for filing FELA claim against employer had cause of action for
wrongful discharge). But see Johnson v. B & N Steakhouse, 443 So. 2d 924 (Ala. 1983);
Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981); Bottijliso v. Hutchison
Fruit Co., 635 P.2d 992 (N.M. 1981); Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244
S.E.2d 272 (1978).
71. Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979); Molush v. Orkin
Exterminating Co., 547 F. Supp. 54 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
72. See generally Comment, Protecting the Private Sector At Will Employee Who
"Blows the Whistle": A Cause of Action Based on Determinants of Public Policy, 1977 Wis.
L. REv. 777.
73. 85 IMI. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
74. Id. at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878.
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the state criminal code,75 although it acknowledged that no specific
provision of state law required private individuals to ferret out
crime. 6 Stating that public policy favored the plaintiff's conduct,
the court held that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action for
retaliatory discharge.77
Palmateer and similar cases78 represent a minority approach,
however. In other cases along the middle of the continuum, the
clarity of the public policy promoted by the employee's efforts re-
tains predictive value. Courts are much more sympathetic to em-
ployees discharged for advocating compliance with some specific
statute or regulation than to employees whose discharges were oc-
casioned by disagreements over personal interpretations of good
business practice.7 9 Whistleblowers reporting instances of viola-
tions of clearly specified laws have enjoyed greater success than
have those reporting ill-defined instances or patterns of wrongdo-
ing. 0 With one notable exception,8 courts have refused to recog-
75. Id. at 132, 421 N.E.2d at 879.
76. Id. at 132, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
77. Id. at 133, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
78. See Petrik v. Monarch Printing Co., 111 IM. App. 3d 502, 444 N.E.2d 588 (1982) (em-
ployee discharged for reporting his suspicions of a superior's embezzlement of corporate
funds had an actionable claim for retaliatory discharge).
79. Compare Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980)
(employee discharged because of efforts to correct variation between employer's label and
requirements of the Connecticut Food and Drug Act) and Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in
Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) (employee discharged for attempting to correct
bank's illegal practice of overcharging customers) with Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980) (physician employee who opposed development of
drug on belief that her continued participation would violate her Hippocratic oath had no
cause of action) and Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974)
(sales employee voiced misgivings about one of the employer's products; no cause of action
despite praiseworthiness of his motives) and Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41
Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978) (nurse objected to cyclic staffing practice, arguing that
resulting poor patient care would violate broad terms of state nursing statute had no cause
of action) and Maus v. National Living Centers, 633 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. App. 1982) (nurse's
aide who complained about poor patient care had no cause of action despite Texas statute
requiring nursing home employees to report abuse; recognition of a cause of action for legis-
lature or higher court).
80. Compare Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625 (Hawaii 1982) (secretary
stated issue of triable fact in allegation that she was discharged after interview with com-
pany attorney about her knowledge of a superior's antitrust violations to induce her to leave
the jurisdiction; public policy found in antitrust statutes) with Adler v. American Standard
Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981) (plaintiff's complaint that he was discharged for
reporting to internal authorities numerous improper and possibly illegal practices within
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nize the right of employees to voice complaints or objections to
employers' practices8 2 as a public policy giving rise to an action for
wrongful discharge.
Judicial intervention is highly unlikely at the extreme end of the
continuum where cases have involved private disputes or internal
matters in which no clearly expressed public interest is implicated.
Courts have rejected claims of wrongful discharge when employees
were discharged for complaining about personnel policies"3 and
poor internal management, 4 for announcing the intention to at-
corporation was too vague and conclusory to state a claim) and Martin v. Platt, 179 Ind.
App. 688, 386 N.E.2d 1026 (1979) (plaintiff discharged for reporting to company officials
that an employer was taking kickbacks did not state a claim; court declined to provide a
remedy for a discharge that violates general public policy).
A few states have statutes that prohibit discharge or discipline of whistleblowers in the
private sector. These statutes provide a remedy only when the employee reports a violation
or suspected violation of a state or federal law or regulation or municipal ordinance or regu-
lation to a public body. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m (West. Supp. 1983); MICH.
Comp. LAWS ANN. § 15.362.(West 1981); see also Suchodolski v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co.,
412 Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 710 (1982). Washington's whistleblower statute provides a broad
scope of protected disclosure for public employees, who are permitted to report without loss
of employment a variety of ill-defined wrongs such as abuse of authority, commission of an
act that substantially threatens public health or safety, or gross waste of public funds. See
WAsH. Rav. CODE §§ 42.40.010-42.40.050 (West. Supp. 1984).
81. In Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983), the plaintiff was asked
to participate in a lobbying effort for no-fault reform. When he refused and privately stated
his opposition to the company's position, he was discharged. The court found that political
and associational freedoms constituted a significant public policy and reinstated plaintiff's
claim. Id. at 898-900.
Connecticut recently enacted a statute providing that any employer who subjects an em-
ployee to discipline or discharge on account of the employee's exercise of first amendment
rights is liable for damages including punitive damages and costs of the action, providing
that the employee's exercise of rights does not substantially or materially interfere with job
performance or working relationships. See 1983 CONN. PuB. Acrs 83-578.
82. See, e.g., Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. 320, 620 P.2d 699 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1980) (employee, discharged for filing suit naming employer as defendant, had no cause of
action for wrongful discharge); Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (employee, discharged for refusal to submit to psychological stress
evaluation test required of all employees, had no right to refuse to follow company policy);
Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978) (nurse who
objected to staffing practices of hospital employer had no cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge); Suchodoski v. Michigan ConsoL Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 710 (1982) (no
public policy offended by discharge of employee who discovered and reported poor internal
management).
83. Boresen v. Rohm & Haas, Inc., 526 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
84. Suchodolski v. Michigan Consol. Gas. Co., 412 Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 710 (1982).
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tend law school at night,8 5 for destroying a pair of work gloves, se
for smoking marijuana in the presence of company personnel and
having an affair with a secretary, 87 and for testifying truthfully and
becoming a party to a lawsuit against the employer.88
The policy favoring employer discretion in matters related to the
efficient operation of the workplace is most apparent in courts'
"hands-off" approach to these cases. Included in this category are
the conscientious objector and whistleblower cases, in which em-
ployees are discharged for reporting or complaining about practices
that violate their personal judgment or moral code but do not vio-
late any specific statute, regulation, or ordinance. Situations in
which employees become embroiled in disputes with management
about issues open to interpretation are fraught with internal politi-
cal ramifications, and judicial intervention is such cases could un-
duly burden managerial discretion. Absent the existence of a clear
expression of public policy, it is difficult to articulate a legal stan-
dard that would grant a remedy to employees acting reasonably
and in good conscience but that would not also create a cause of
action for almost any disruptive or disloyal employee. These cases
demonstrate courts' conviction that employees' individual free-
doms and any general policy favoring the promotion of job security
do not justify judicial intervention.8"
3. Breach of The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing
The third, and most malleable, formulation of the action for
wrongful discharge is breach of the implied-in-law convenant of
good faith and fair dealing.90 The implied covenant approach
85. Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
86. Mead Johnson & Co. v. Oppenheimer, 458 N.E.2d 668 (Ind. App. 1984).
87. Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wisc. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).
88. Meredith v. C.E. Walther, Inc., 422 So. 2d 761 (Ala. 1982).
89. See Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisers, 152 Cal. App. 3d 530, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613
(1984).
90. Four states recognize an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employ-
ment contracts: Alaska: Mitford v. Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983); California: Cleary
v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980); Massachusetts:
Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Montana:
Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1982).
A fifth state, New Hampshire, originated the theory in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114
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blends the underlying objectives of the other two approaches. It is
directed at policing undesirable conduct, a traditional concern of
public policy, and at preventing the bad faith frustration of an em-
ployee's expectations; it is essentially an extremely broad public
policy approach in which judicially declared policies become incor-
porated in the employment contract.91
This approach is an extension of the development of implied du-
ties of good faith and fair dealing on the part of insurance compa-
nies, a trend that began in the late 1960's.92 Its development in
employment contracts can be traced to the 1974 New Hampshire
case, Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.93 In Monge, a press machine op-
erator was discharged in retaliation for her refusal to date her fore-
man. The New Hampshire Supreme Court stated that the public
had an interest in maintaining a proper balance between the em-
ployee's interest in maintaining employment and the employer's
interest in running his business as he sees fit.9 4 It concluded that
terminations motivated by bad faith, malice, or retaliaton contra-
vene the interests of the economic system and the public good, and
constitute a breach of contract.9 5 Although the court did not men-
tion the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by name,
its finding of an extracontractual duty not to terminate in bad
faith accomplishes the same result.9 6
N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974), but more recent New Hampshire cases have restricted sub-
stantially the holding of Monge. See infra note 96.
91. See Note, supra note 58, at 216-22.
92. See Crisci v. Security Pacific Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967). The development of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is traced in J. MCCARTHY,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN BAD FAITH CASES § 1.15, at 31-40 (1983); see also Note, Good Faith
and Fair Dealing in Insurance Contracts: Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 25 HASTINGS
L.J. 699 (1974). Several courts deciding wrongful discharge cases have alluded to the insur-
ance cases as authority for the implication of a duty of good faith and fair dealing. See, e.g.,
Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 728 (1980);
Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 618 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Mont. 1982).
93. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
94. Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551.
95. Id.
96. More recent New Hampshire cases restrict the Monge approach by requiring both bad
faith and a violation of public policy for a wrongful discharge cause of action. See Cloutier v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981). Although Monge was
decided on a contract theory and limited damages to lost wages, New Hampshire's new two-
pronged cause of action now is analyzed as a hybrid between contract and tort. Vandegrift v.
American Brands Corp., 572 F. Supp. 496, 499 (D.N.H. 1983). It is unclear whether a suc-
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The breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing cause of action was articulated expressly in Fortune v. Na-
tional Cash Register Co.,97 a 1977 Massachusetts case. In Fortune,
a salesman alleged that his employer discharged him in bad faith
to decrease the commission he would otherwise have received for a
large sale. Pointing to a variety of contracts in which courts have
applied the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and citing Monge
as authority for the extension of the duty to employment con-
tracts, the court observed that good faith and fair dealing are per-
vasive requirements in the law.98 Though the court recognized an
employer's need to control its work force and its right to act in its
own legitimate business interests, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts stated that, when commissions are paid for work
performed by an employee, the decision to terminate an at will em-
ployee should be made in good faith.9 Although the court found a
breach of contract on the facts before it,oO it refused to speculate
whether it would apply the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing to all contracts for at will employment.1 °'
The United States District Court for the District of Massachu-
setts applied Massachusetts law and extended the holding in For-
tune to an at will employee when the avoidance of payment of ben-
efits was not an issue. In McKinney v. National Dairy Council,02
the district court held the dismissal of an employee because of his
cessful plaintiff in New Hampshire would still be restricted to contract damages.
97. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
98. Id. at 102-04, 364 N.E.2d at 1256-57.
99. Id. at 104, 364 N.E.2d at 1256
100. Id. at 104, 364 N.E.2d at 1257.
101. Id. Similar results have been reached in subsequent cases where employees were dis-
charged to avoid the payment of commissions and other benefits. See Mitford v. Lasala, 666
P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983); Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, Inc., 386 Mass. 877, 438
N.E.2d 351 (1982); cf. Cappiello v. Ragen Precision Indus., Inc., 192 N.J. Super. 523, 471
A.2d 432 (1984) (recovery on express contract, not employing covenant of good faith and fair
dealing).
In Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), an employee was dis-
charged two years before his pension rights were to vest to avoid the expense of paying into
the pension plan. The District Court held that this gave rise to a cause of action for wrong-
ful discharge under New York law as a violation of the public policy favoring the integrity of
pension plans. The precedential value of this case is doubtful, however, because New York
rejected the cause of action for wrongful discharge three years later in Murphy v. American
Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86 (1983).
102. 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980).
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age violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.'
In Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Co., 0 4 the Montana Su-
preme Court held that an employer who obtains plaintiff's resigna-
tion by deceptive means breaches the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing 05 even though the facts of the case indicate that the
employer would have had ample cause for discharging the plaintiff.
Several courts have refused to apply the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in employment contracts on the ground that it
would require an employer to prove just cause for every termina-
tion.108 This concern is unfounded because good faith is not the
equivalent of good cause. A good cause standard permits the trier
of fact to find a discharge wrongful if the facts of the case do not
demonstrate a fair and honest reason for the discharge. 0 7 Con-
versely, to satisfy a good faith standard, a good reason for the dis-
charge need not exist. Instead, only the absence of a bad faith mo-
tive or conduct need exist. 08 An employee's discharge for reasons
of personal dislike or as a result of sloppy, negligent, or unfair bus-
iness practice does not constitute a breach of the covenant of good
faith.109
The closest any implied covenant case has come to treating good
faith as being equal to good cause is Cleary v. American Airlines,
Inc.10 In Cleary, an employee of eighteen years was discharged,
ostensibly for infractions of company regulations. The plaintiff al-
leged that no complete or honest investigation preceded his dis-
103. Id. at 1121-22.
104. 638 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1982).
105. Id. at 1062; see also Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 668 P.2d 213 (Mont. 1983) (a
subsequent appeal on the issue of damages).
106. See, e.g., Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 129 Ariz. 320, _, 620 P.2d 699, 703 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1980); cf. Rozier v. St. Mary's Hospital, 88 Ill. App. 3d 994, 999, 411 N.E.2d 50, 54
(1980) (declining to accept general public policy approach); Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l, Inc.,
65 Or. App. 160, 165, 670 P.2d 218, 222 (1983) (same).
107. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 330, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927-28
(1981).
108. See Krauskopf, supra note 12, at 215.
109. Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., Inc., 37 Conn. Supp. 38, 429 A.2d 492 (1980); Gram v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 659, 429 N.E.2d 21 (1981); Siles v. Travenol Laboratories,
Inc., 13 Mass. App. 354, 433 N.E.2d 103 (1982); cf. Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors,
152 Cal. App. 3d 530, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1984) (unless case came within one of three theo-"
ries for wrongful discharge recognized in California, employee had no cause of action).
110. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
470 [Vol. 26:449
PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
charge and that the discharge was actually in retaliation for his
unionizing activities. The California Court of Appeals held that the
plaintiff had stated a cause of action under the public policy the-
ory but that he was entitled to his day in court under the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing theory even if his public
policy allegations were later stricken.111 The court stated that ter-
mination of employment without legal cause after eighteen years of
service offends the implied covenant, which requires that the em-
ployer do nothing to deprive the employee of the benefit of the
employment bargain." 2 Cleary is a case unusual in both its facts
and its approach. In most implied covenant cases, courts have not
inferred bad faith from the absence of good cause. Bad faith has
not meant the use of the power of termination without good rea-
son, but rather the abuse of the power of termination.113 Courts
have found abuse in the use of the power of termination for ulte-
rior reasons unrelated to job performance 14 and in reprehensible
conduct surrounding the termination.
A more meritorious concern that has led other courts to reject
the implied covenant approach is that the concept of good faith is
even more amorphous than the concept of public policy." '5 Al-
though a good faith standard would not render an employer liable
for every unjustified discharge, it would subject employers to un-
predictable lawsuits in which sympathetic juries would be permit-
ted to decide whether the employer's conduct comported with an
inherently nebulous and subjective standard.",, The implied cove-
nant theory represents a flexible standard that can facilitate em-
ployees' expectations and police wrongful conduct that is not nec-
essarily illegal, but it suffers from obvious deficiencies in certainty
and predictability.
The three wrongful discharge theories place substantial limita-
111. Id. at 455-56, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
112. Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
113. See Krauskopf, supra note 12, at 215.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 629 (Hawaii 1982);
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wisc. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834, 838 (1983).
116. Cf. Rozier v. St. Mary's Hosp., 88 IlM. App. 3d 994, 998-99, 411 N.E.2d 50, 53-54
(1980) (general public policy standard would result in increased possibility of litigation, har-
assment of employers, and life tenure regardless of job performance).
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tions on employers' power to dismiss at will employees. These the-
ories merely define the outer limits of the employer's discretion,
however, and leave undisturbed the right to terminate at will in all
but exceptional situations. The determination of whether punitive
damages should be available in wrongful discharge cases is compli-
cated by the lack of consensus concerning the theories of recovery
recognized and the approaches used within a given theory. Any
formulation of guidelines for the use of punitive damages in wrong-
ful discharge cases must consider the purposes to be served by
both punitive damages and wrongful discharge doctrines.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Punitive civil remedies are of ancient origin, dating as far back
as the Code of Hammurabi in 2000 B.C.. n1 In the common law
system, the development of punitive damages was largely an his-
torical accident. In a period in which clear damages formulae had
not yet been established, English courts rationalized their reluc-
tance to disturb jury verdicts by stating that the jury could impose
an extra measure of damages by way of example to a defendant
whose conduct had been especially wrongful.118 American jurisdic-
tions readily adopted the doctrine of punitive damages,119 and it
quickly became so well-engrained in American law that in 1851,
the United States Supreme Court remarked that the availability of
punitive damages "will not admit of argument.' 120
Although one commentator has argued that punitive damages
are anachronistic in an era of well-developed damages law, 21 the
expansive application of such damages indicates that the contin-
117. See K REDDEN, PUNITwE DAMAGES § 2.2(a)(1), at 24 (1980); Igoe, Punitive Damages:
An Analytical Perspective, TRIAL, Nov. 1978, at 48, 50.
118. For an extensive' discussion of the historical development of punitive damages in the
common law, see Sullivan, supra note 5, at 208-14.
119. See, e.g., Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 90 (1791); Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C. (1 Bay. 6) 3
(1784).
120. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851). Recently the United States
Supreme Court stated, "Although there was debate about the theoretical correctness of the
punitive damages doctrine in the latter part of the last century, the doctrine was accepted as
settled law by nearly all state and federal courts, including this Court." Smith v. Wade, 461
U.S. 30 (1983).
121. Duffy, Punitive Damages: A Doctrine Which Should Be Abolished, in THE CASE
AGAINST PUNITIvE DAMAGES 4 (Defense Research Institute 1969).
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ued existence of a punitive civil remedy is not due to mere judicial
inertia, but rather to the reality that the doctrine serves useful
purposes in modern law. All damage remedies perform a compen-
satory or reparative function and, to the extent that liability for
damages depends on a finding of the defendant's failure to comply
with some duty supplied by law or contract, all damage remedies
perform an admonitory function.122 Although the doctrine of puni-
tive damages serves a compensatory purpose, its primary purpose
is to strengthen the admonitory force of the civil law.123
A. Purposes Served by Punitive Damages
One obvious purpose of punitive damages is to punish the defen-
dant for his wrongful act.124 This institutionalized retribution ex-
presses society's disapproval of the act and thus operates as moral
education of the defendant. 2 5 It reduces tensions aroused by a
flouting of social order and decreases the likelihood that victims of
wrongful conduct will resort to violent means of self-help.'26
Another major purpose of punitive damages is to deter the de-
fendant and others like him from engaging in similar future mis-
conduct.127 As a practical matter, this purpose is inseparable from
the punitive purpose because deterrence is the hoped-for by-
product of the punishment. The use of punitive damages is espe-
cially valuable in cases where, because of small compensatory dam-
ages or the absence of other sanctions, the defendant would have
little else to lose by commiting the wrongful act.128 A defendant
contemplating a breach of duty under these circumstances would
have a strong temptation to breach if the benefit to him exceeded
the cost of breaching. The threat of becoming subject to a punitive
damages award in an uncertain sum, however, renders such a cal-
122. See Morris, supra note 5, at 1173-76.
123. Id.
124. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1981); see also
Ellis, supra note 2, at 6-8; Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L.
REv. 870, 876-77 (1976).
125. See Owen, Civil Punishment, supra note 5, at 109.
126. See Morris, supra note 5, at 1198-99; see also Mallor & Roberts, supra note 5, at
650.
127. E.g., Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 1978); Arie v. Intertherm, Inc., 648
S.W.2d 142, 159 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
128. See, e.g., Harris v. Wagshal, 343 A.2d 283, 288-89 n.13 (D.C. App. 1975).
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culated cost-benefit analysis impossible.' 2 Thus, the availability of
punitive damages can have a powerful tempering effect on the be-
havior of certain types of defendants." 0
Another method by which punitive damages furthers the en-
forcement of civil law is by creating an incentive for private indi-
viduals to bring wrongdoers to justice.' 3' The financial incentive of
recovering punitive damages can be an important factor in moti-
vating a plaintiff to press a claim,"3 2 particularly one for which only
a small compensatory remedy is available. Because a wide range of
socially undesirable behavior is not defined as a crime or likely to
be punished criminally, private lawsuits may be the only opportu-
nity for courts to punish such behavior. The more extreme the mis-
conduct, the greater is society's interest in having the wrongdoer
brought to justice.
Finally, punitive damages serve a compensatory function by
compensating the plaintiff for transactional expenses such as attor-
neys' fees that generally are not recoverable in the American legal
system.1 3 Absent the availability of a punitive remedy, the victim
129. For example, punitive damages have been used to deter bad faith patterns of con-
duct by insurers. See, e.g., Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 582 P.2d 980, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 389 (1978).
130. See Owen, Civil Punishment, supra note 5, at 105-06 (suggesting that punitive dam-
ages have a greater deterrent impact on institutional and professional defendants than on
individual defendants).
131. See, e.g., Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Kink v. Combs, 28 Wis.
2d 65, 80, 135 N.W.2d 789, 798 (1965); see also D. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 3.9, at 205. The
same desire to stimulate law enforcement by private individuals underlies statutory treble-
damage remedies available under the antitrust laws. Brown, 253 F.2d at 40 n.16.
132. In his text on punitive damages, Professor Kenneth Redden states that proposed
legislation in California giving punitive damages awards to public interest organizations
would have a "'chilling' if not a fatal effect" on punitive damages. K. REDDEN, supra note
117, § 1.1(c), at 13.
133. For a discussion of the American rule regarding attorneys' fees and judicially created
exceptions to that rule, see generally Mallor, Punitive Attorneys' Fees for Abuses of the
Judicial System, 61 N.C.L. REv. 613 (1983).
In a minority of jurisdictions, punitive damages are awarded to compensate plaintiffs for
mental anguish and other intangible harms. See Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West,
716 F.2d 378, 389 (6th Cir. 1983) (applying Michigan law); LeBlanc v. Spector, 378 F. Supp.
301, 306 (D. Conn. 1973); Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 190 N.W. 746 (1922); Bixby v.
Dunlap, 56 N.H. 456, 462 (1876); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1872); Carnation Co. v.
Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450, 454 (Tex. 1980). In Connecticut the amount of punitive damages
awarded is limited to plaintiff's attorney's fees. See Triangle Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v.
Silver, 154 Conn. 116, 222 A.2d 220 (1966).
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of extreme misconduct would not be made whole by a compensa-
tory award because that award would be diminished by the
amount necessary to pay litigation expenses. Although most suc-
cessful plaintiffs in the American system obtain the same results,
the need to sanction persons who have acted outrageously renders
incomplete compensation less tolerable in actions brought by vic-
tims of aggravated misconduct.
B. Negative Aspects of Punitwe Damages
The doctrine of punitive damages can be justified as a useful
tool for promoting adherence to the law, but it has serious flaws. A
number of legal writers have urged reform, limitation, or even abo-
lition of punitive damages. The imposition of punitive damages
does not involve the same stigma or threatened loss of liberty as
does criminal punishment, but such an award does duplicate some
of the functions of the criminal law without the same procedural
safeguards and constitutional guarantees.1 34 Because courts sitting
in different cases involving the same defendant lack coordination,
a defendant upon whom punitive damages are nposed may be
subjected to multiple punishment. He may be punished by the as-
sessment of punitive damages, by the mental anguish item of the
compensatory award, and by the imposition of a criminal
sanction.13 5
The standards and procedures used in the administration of pu-
nitive damages also have been criticized. Generally, evidence con-
cerning a defendant's wealth is admissible at trial when punitive
damages are sought so that the damages assessed may be in rea-
sonable proportion to the defendant's ability to pay.3" Such evi-
134. Duffy, supra note 121, at 9; Ghiardi, Should Punitive Damages by Abolished?-A
Statement for the Affirmative, 1965 ABA PROCEEDINGS, SECTION OF INS., NEGLIGENCE, AND
COMPENSATION LAW 282, 287-88; Long, supra note 124, at 885; Note, The Imposition of Pun-
ishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 1158, 1161-
62 (1966).
It also has been argued that a reform of punitive damages procedures is constitutionally
compelled. See Ford, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, m THE CASE AGAINST
PUNrIVE DAMAGES 15 (Defense Research Institute 1969) (arguing that punitive damages are
unconstitutional). See generally Wheeler, supra note 2.
135. Duffy, supra note 121, at 10; Moms, supra note 5, at 1195-98.
136. E.g., Coy v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 210, 373 P.2d 457, 23 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1962);
Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Central Beverage Co., 359 N.E.2d 566, 581 (Ind. App. 1977).
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dence may induce a "Robin Hood" attitude on the part of jurors,
leading them to compromise doubts about liability or to render ex-
cessive verdicts. 1 7 Loosely defined standards of conduct and the
absence of clear guidelines about the amount of damages to be as-
sessed 38 heighten the danger of unfair or inefficient results. 39
These weaknesses of punitive damages demonstrate the
problems that the doctrine can cause absent careful judicial super-
vision. Several commentators have advocated changes in the ad-
ministration of the remedy, such as bifurcated trials separating the
questions of liability and punishment, 4" clear articulation of the
conduct warranting punitive damage awards,' 4 ' and statutory ceil-
ings for punitive damage awards,142 that would ameliorate most of
the flaws inherent in the doctrine.
C. Conduct Warranting the Application of Punitive Damages
Courts use a plethora of adjectives to describe the type of con-
duct that warrants a punitive damages award. 43 One court listed
"willful, wanton, malicious, reckless, oppressive, grossly negligent,"
"fraudulent, and. . bad faith" conduct as giving rise to a puni-
tive damages award.14 4 Courts frequently note that a defendant's
state of mind separates conduct for which no punitive remedy
should be imposed from that which warrants such a remedy. 1 5
This focus accords with the retributive purpose of punitive dam-
See generally Note, Punitive Damages: An Exception to the Right of Privacy?: Coy v. Su-
perior Court, 5 PEPPERDiNE L. REV. 145 (1977).
137. DuBois, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury Products Liability and Professional
Malpractice Cases: Bonanza or Disaster?, 43 INS. Co. J. 344, 353 (1976); see also Morris,
supra note 5, at 1191; Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 5, at 1320-21. '
138. Duffy, supra note 121, at 10; Ghiardi, supra note 134, at 287; Owen, Civil Punish-
ment, supra note 5, at 119.
139. Ellis, supra note 2, at 39-46; Owen, Civil Punishment, supra note 5, at 114.
140. See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 5, at 663-66; Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note
5, at 1320-25; Wheeler, supra note 2, at 300-02, 320-22.
141. See Ellis, supra note 2, at 34-40; Mallor & Roberts, supra note 5, at 651-63; Owen,
Civil Punishment, supra note 5, at 114-17.
142. See Owen, Civil Punishment, supra note 5, at 119; Wheeler, supra note 2, at 314-20.
143. One author remarked that punitive damages are used in an "astounding range of
conduct from 'oppression, fraud, or malice' on the one extreme to 'rudeness' or 'mere ca-
price' on the other." Long, supra note 124, at 881.
144. Ruiz v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 97 N.M. 194, 201, 638 P.2d 406, 413 (1981).
145. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 2, at 11 (5th ed. 1974).
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ages because an act done with subjective perception of the risks to
the plaintiff's interests is more abhorrent than the same act com-
mited inadvertently It also conforms to the deterrent purpose of
punitive damages because the threat of compensatory damages ob-
viously has failed to deter a defendant who intentionally inflicts
harm or who inflicts harm after reflection on the risks attending
his conduct. By contrast, it is not appropriate to levy punitive
damages for merely negligent conduct.14 To the extent that negli-
gent conduct can be deterred at all, compensatory damages per-
forms this function satisfactorily In addition, although negligence
may be wrong, it is an understandable, everyday event that does
not warrant retribution. 147
Actual malice or intent to harm is not required for a defendant's
state of mind to be considered culpable, however. 48 Culpability
sufficient to merit punitive damages also is found in conduct in
which the "entire want of care [raises] the presumption of a con-
scious indifference to the consequences.' ' 49 In this state of mind,
the actor may not intend to cause harm; nevertheless, he chooses
to advance his interests over those of the plaintiff. 15 Where his
choice was wrong and he should have appreciated that it was
wrong, punitive damages will lie.151
The conscious indifference standard has been used to impose pu-
nitive damages on powerful industries to halt harmful methods of
doing business. The recent application of punitive damages to
cases involving bad faith breaches of duty by insurance compa-
146. E.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Executive Estates, Inc., 194 Ind. App. 674, 369
N.E.2d 1117, 1130-31 (1978); see also K. REDDEN, supra note 117, § 4.2, at 79. Courts have
awarded punitive damages, however, when the defendant's conduct constitutes gross negli-
gence, as exemplified by cases involving drunken driving. See Taylor v. Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979); Nichols v.
Hocke, 297 N.W.2d 205 (Iowa 1980); see generally Comment, Punitive Damages and the
Drunken Driver, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 117 (1980); Note, Tort Damages-Punitive Damages
Properly Awarded Against Intoxicated Drivers-Taylor v. Superior Court, 20 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 1013 (1980).
147. Owen, Civil Punishment, supra note 5, at 107. The author notes that this state of
mind might be sufficient to justify punitive damages against institutional and professional
defendants who are granted greater power by society.
148. Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983).
149. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489, 495 (1875).
150. See Owen, Civil Punishment, supra note 5, at 107.
151. Id.
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nies152 demonstrates the attenuation of the state of mind require-
ment. Courts sometimes state that the insurer's bad faith, standing
alone, is insufficient to warrant punitive damages. 153 Courts appear
to have difficulty perceiving the distinction between bad faith and
conduct giving rise to punitive damages, such as oppression'54 or
conduct that is an extreme deviation from the norm. 155 Numerous
cases exist in which courts imposed punitive damages on insurers
when the tenor of the insurer's wrongdoing was an unjustifiable
breach of duty.'56 Evidently, courts are really distinguishing be-
tween inadvertent or good faith conduct and conduct that is calcu-
lated to exploit the superior power of the insurance company at
the expense of the interests of a weaker party. 5 '
This line of cases supports the suggestion of Professor David
Owen that the essence of conduct warranting a punitive damages
152. See J. McCARTHY, supra note 92, §§ 1.41-1.42, at 90-97; K. REDDEN, supra note 117,
§ 84.4(c), at 113-14. See generally Geck, Outrage, Punitive Damages, and the Insurance
Industry, 29 FED. INS. Co. Q. 97 (1979); Comment, Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co.:
The Expanding Use of Punitive Damages in Breach of Insurance Contract Actions, 15 SAN
DIEGo L. REv. 309 (1978).
153. See, e.g., Escambia Treating Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 421 F. Supp. 1367, 1371
(N.D. Fla. 1976); Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 405 So. 2d 916, 925 (Ala. 1981);
Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 462, 521 P.2d 1103, 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr.
711, 718 (1974).
154. See Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 264 Ind. 599, 608-609, 349 N.E.2d 173,
180-81 (1976).
155. Continental.Re-Ins. Co. v. Spanton, 667 F.2d 1289, 1291 (9th Cir. 1982); Linscott v.
Rainier Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 854, 860, 606 P.2d 958, 962 (1980).
156. See, e.g., Miller v. Elite Ins. Co., 100 Cal. App. 3d 799, 161 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1980)
(unwarranted refusal to accept reasonable settlement justified punitive damages instruc-
tion); Riverside Ins. Co. v. Pedigo, 430 N.E.2d 796 (Ind. App. 1982) (insurer's failure to
inform insureds of arson investigation and unjustified refusal to pay claim gave rise to puni-
tive damages); Lipinski v. Title Ins. Co., 655 P.2d 970 (Mont. 1982) (defendant's bad faith
failure to disclose easement and provide defense justified punitive damages, though case was
remanded for redetermination of amount of damages); First Security Bank of Bozeman v.
Goddard, 181 Mont. 407, 593 P.2d 1040 (1979) (malice inferred from fact that defendant's
actions were unjustified).
157. See Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (breach of contract by real
estate broker); see also Vernon Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 264 Ind. 599, 609-10, 349
N.E.2d 173, 181 (1976) (punitive damages not available if defendant has merely exercised a
right to disagree or has been guilty of substandard business conduct); Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Neville, 434 N.E.2d 585, 595 (Ind. App. 1982) (more than good faith dispute which
leads to a breach of contract needed for award of punitive damages); Continental Cas. Co. v.
Novy, 437 N.E.2d 1338, 1356 (Ind. App. 1982) (lack of diligent investigation alone not suffi-
cient basis for imposition of punitive damages); Consolidated Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Touche,
410 So. 2d 1303, 1305 (Miss. 1982) (no punitive damages if good faith dispute).
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award is the abuse of power.158 When society has granted to an
entity a high degree of power over the welfare of others, it main-
tains correspondingly high expectations for the responsible use of
that power.159 The traditional state-of-mind test, which is based on
human emotions, fits uncomfortably into the context of identifying
and punishing destructive patterns of behavior on the part of large
corporations. In such cases, the culpable conduct involved is the
exploitation of power with organizational indifference to the
consequences.
III. THE APPLICATION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO CASES
INVOLVING WRONGFUL DISCHARGES OF AT WILL EMPLOYEES
A. The Current Case Law
Most of the appellate decisions regarding wrongful discharge of
at will employees have focused on the recognition of a right action.
It is not surprising, then, that decisions about damages in such
cases are both sparse and inconsistent.1 60 No consensus exist-even
within a given theory-about the items to be included in the com-
pensatory remedy,161 and there is wide disagreement about the ap-
plicability of punitive damages. Courts employ three general
approaches.
1. Punitive Damages Approved
Courts have approved the use of punitive damages in a number
158. Owen, Civil Punishment, supra note 5, at 104-07.
159. Id. at 105; see also Central Armature Works, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 520
F. Supp. 283, 292 (D.D.C. 1980) (stating in its discussion of punitive damages that "an in-
surer has additional obligations to its insured which subject it to more stringent standards
of conduct than those normally imposed on parties to a contract").
160. For example, in Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 289 S.E.2d 692, 700 (W. Va.
1982) (Harless II), a second appeal was necessary to determine the extent of damages avail-
able for the retaliatory discharge action first recognized in West Virginia four years earlier
in Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) (Harless 1). The
court in Harless II noted that the law regarding damages in such cases is "rather sparse."
Harless II, 289 S.E.2d at 700.
161. Compare Wiskotoni v. Michigan Natl Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378, 388 (6th Cir. 1983)
(compensatory remedy includes damages for past and future lost wages, mental anguish, loss
of professional reputation, and moving expenses) with Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113
Wisc. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834, 841 (1983) (compensatory remedy limited to reinstatement
and back pay).
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of wrongful discharge cases. 1 2 Not surprisingly, all but three of
these cases were decided under a public policy tort theory. The
exceptions were grounded in breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.1 3 Courts justified awarding punitive
damages in this latter group of cases by recasting the implied cove-
nant into an action sounding in tort."6
Courts primarily justify the use of punitive damages by citing
the need for an extra measure of deterrence in light of petty com-
pensatory remedies or criminal sanctions.'65 As the Supreme Court
of Illinois stated in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.,"6 "[t]he imposition
on the employer of that small additional obligation to pay a wrong-
fully discharged employee compensation would do little to discour-
age the practice of retaliatory discharge, which mocks the public
162. Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982); Cleary v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rep. 722 (1980); Kouff v. Bethlehem-
Alameda Shipyard, Inc., 90 Cal. App. 2d 322, 202 P.2d 1059 (1949); Palmateer v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421, N.E.2d 876 (1981); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.
2d 172, 384 N.E.2d (1979); Arie v. Intertherm, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. App. 1983); Gates
v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 668 P.2d 213 (Mont. 1983); Hansen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394
(Nev. 1984); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.H. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980); Lally v.
Copygraphics, 173 N.J. Super. 162, 413 A.2d 960 (1980); Vigil v. Arzola, 22 N.M. ST. B.
BULL. 868 (N.M. App. 1983); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Carnation Co.
v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1980); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 289 S.E.2d
692 (W. Va. 1982).
All of these cases approve punitive damages in principle. A number of them occurred at
the pretrial stage. Others held that, although they would be available in future cases, puni-
tive damages were inappropriate under the facts presented. Actual awards of punitive dam-
ages were affirmed in Cancellier (age discrimination), Gates (deceptive conduct in termina-
tion process), Carnation (retaliation for filing workers' compensation claim), and Arie
(same).
163. Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982); Gates v. Life of
Mont. Ins. Co., 668 P.2d 213 (Mont. 1983); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App.
3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980); cf. Vigil v. Arzola, 22 N.M. ST. B. BULL 868, 874 (N.M.
App. 1983) (compensatory remedies for a tort cause of action for wrongful discharge were
limited to contract remedies, but the use of punitive damages in appropriate cases was
approved).
164. Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir. 1982); Cleary v.
American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 457, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (1980); Gates v.
Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 668 P.2d 213, 215 (Mont. 1983).
165. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 185-87, 384 N.E.2d 353, 358-59
(1979); Hansen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394, 397 (Nev. 1984); Lally v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J.
Super. 162, 179-80, 413 A.2d 960, 968-69 (1980); Vigil v. Arzola, 22 N.M. ST. B. BULL. 868,
874 (N.M. App. 1983).
166. 74 111. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979).
PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
policy of this State .. ."167 The importance of the social policy
threatened by the discharge is proportionately related to the need
for deterrence.6 8 In Lally v. Copygraphics,'169 a case in which an
employee was discharged for filing a workers' compensation claim,
the Superior Court of New Jersey stated that the policy inherent
in the statute outlawing retaliatory discharge was "so firmly
grounded in the public interest as to require assiduous protection
and enforcement.' 170
One issue that has arisen is whether the conduct that justifies
the compensatory remedy would automatically justify the imposi-
tion of punitive damages. Although a few of the wrongful discharge
cases have stated that punitive damages should be available in fu-
ture cases without requiring particularly aggravated conduct,' 7 '
Lally comes closest to suggesting that the violation of public policy
in itself would justify punitive damages. The court indicated its
agreement with a commentator who stated that employer conduct
that undermines an employee's right to receive workers' compensa-
tion benefits is a matter of "opprobrium" that is "particularly
repellant.' ' 72 For the most part, however, the courts have indicated
that they will not award punitive damages automatically, 7 but
rather will limit punitive damage awards to cases in which the em-
ployer's misconduct is willful, malicious, wanton, fraudulent, or op-
pressive. 174 If the court applies the conscious indifference standard,
an employer could be considered sufficiently culpable to warrant
167. Id. at 187, 384 N.E.2d at 359.
168. See Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 219-20, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (1975) (punitive damages
appropriate to deter wrongful discharge when there is a violation of a strong public policy).
169. 173 N.J. Super. 162,.413 A.2d 960 (1980).
170. Id. at 179, 413 A.2d at 968.
171. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 IM. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981); Kel-
say v. Motorola, Inc., 74 IMI. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536
P.2d 512 (1975).
172. Laly v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J. Super. 162, 180, 413 A.2d 960, 968 (1980) (citing 2A
A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW (Sept. 1979 Supp.), § 68.36, at 13-40, 13-42).
173. See Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 289 SE.2d 692, 702 (W. Va. 1982); see
also Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 457, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729
(1980) (punitive damages appropriate where plaintiff's proofs comport with standards devel-
oped under state law); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72, 417 A.2d 505,
512 (1980) (punitive damages available in appropriate cases).
174. See Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 668 P.2d 213, 216 (Mont. 1983); Hansen v. Har-
rah's, 675 P.2d 394, 397 (Nev. 1984); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 289 S.E.2d
692, 703 (W. Va. 1982).
1985]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
punitive damages if it uses its power of termination, without some
justification, to violate a clear right of the employee.
Courts also have considered whether they should award punitive
damages in cases of first impression. A number of courts have ap-
proved the use of punitive damages in future cases but have re-
fused to impose them when the case arose before the right of ac-
tion for wrongful discharge was established in that jurisdiction.17 5
The leading authority for this proposition is Nees v. Hocks, 76 a
1975 Oregon case in which an employee was discharged for jury
service. In reversing the punitive damages awarded to plaintiff at
trial, the Supreme Court of Oregon stated that "[t]he assessment
of punitive damages has some of the same functions as the sanc-
tions of criminal law. ' 17 7 For criminal punishment to satisfy consti-
tutional mandates, the defendant must have had knowledge of the
criminality of the conduct. 178 The court noted that unlike other
types of misconduct, discharges in retaliation for jury service were
not yet so common and recurrent as to warrant an extra measure
of deterrence.1 7 9
This approach emphasizes the punitive aspect of punitive dam-
ages and, borrowing from the criminal law, essentially states a no-
tice requirement as a prerequisite for the imposition of such dam-
ages.180 Although the analogy between punitive damages and
criminal punishment is superficially appealing, the piecemeal ap-
plication of substantive and procedural protections of the criminal
law to punitive damages cases 81 is questionable. A notice require-
ment is useful for preventing the chilling of legitimate business
decisionmaking, 82 but the Nees approach is too narrow and
mechanical to achieve a desirable level of deterrence.
175. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Il1. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981); Kel-
say v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979); Hansen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394
(Nev. 1984); Vigil v. Arzola, 22 N.M. St. B. Bull., 868 (N.M. App. 1983); Brown v. Transcon
Lines, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
176. 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
177. Id. at 221, 536 P.2d at 517.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See Ellis, supra note 2, at 5-6.
181. See generally Wheeler, supra note 2 (discussing reforms in the administration of
punitive damages which the author argues are constitutionally mandated).
182. See infra text accompanying notes 229-35.
[Vol. 26:449
PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
Rather than requiring a preexisting case declaring the action-
ability of wrongful discharge, courts should inquire whether the
employer had any means of appreciating that its conduct was
wrongful. A statute prohibiting the discharge would certainly put
the employer on notice that such conduct is wrongful, even if no
private cause of action is specified in the statute. For example, in
Kouff v. Bethlehem-Alameda Shipyard,18 3 another case of first im-
pression, the California District Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit permitted a plaintiff who was discharged in violation of a Cali-
fornia statute that forbade discharge of persons for serving as
elections officers to maintain an action for wrongful discharge. The
court held his allegation of malice sufficient as a matter of pleading
to state his claim for punitive damages.184 In Brown v. Transcon
Lines,'185 however, where a state statute provided that discharging
employees for filing workers' compensation claims was an unlawful
employment practice, the Oregon Supreme Court rejected the
plaintiff's claim for punitive damages because his dismissal oc-
curred only eighteen days after the Nees case was decided. 8 6 The
court stated that eighteen days was not an adequate amount of
time for the employer to have known and understood the applica-
tion of Nees.18 7 It seems absurd to argue that when a statute for-
bids the conduct involved, punitive damages should be withheld
merely because the employer did not know that it would be subject
to civil liability for the discharge. The implication that employers
are not aware of statutes but are aware of appellate court decisions
strains credulity
A court also might find that the employer had notice that a
given discharge would be wrongful when the discharge interferes
with a well-known and clearly established personal right or public
interest. A defendant who knows or has good reason to know of an
established right held by the plaintiff (such as the right to claim
workers' compensation benefits for on-the-job injuries) might ex-
pect that interference with that right is wrongful, regardless of
whether a court of that jurisdiction has expressly held it to consti-
183. 90 Cal. App. 2d 322, 202 P.2d 1059 (1949).
184. Id. at 325, 202 P.2d at 1061.
185. 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978) (en banc).
186. Id. at 613-14, 588 P.2d at 1095.
187. Id. at 614, 588 P.2d at 1095.
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tute a tort.188
Notice also could result from well-known legal duties and stan-
dards of conduct. For example, the Supreme Court of Montana, in
Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Co.,""9 awarded $50,000 in pu-
nitive damages against an employer whose agent had induced the
plaintiff to resign by promising to write a letter of recommenda-
tion, when in fact he did not intend to do so, and had breached his
promise to return her letter of resignation. The court justified the
punitive damages award, even though they were being imposed in
a case of first impression, because the court did not assess punitive
damages against the employer for his decision to terminate the
plaintiff.190 Rather, the court assessed punitive damages because
the employer's conduct in obtaining the letter of recommendation
formed the basis for fraud, oppression, or malice. 19'
Because of the rapid proliferation of wrongful discharge actions,
only a limited number of cases of first impression remain. Never-
theless, risks exist in applying an overly mechanical test for notice.
These risks include the reduction in incentives for a plaintiff to
institute and pursue the first case in a jurisdiction, the sacrifice of
those who have acted as private attorneys general, and the creation
of an unfortunate precedent for future cases involving newly recog-
nized causes of action.
2. Punitive Damages Not Available Because the Action Lies in
Contract
In several wrongful discharge actions brought on contract theo-
ries, courts have rejected punitive damages claims without any ex-
planation beyond a restatement of the general rule that punitive
damages are not available in contract actions.192 The rule that pu-
188. If this reasoning were used, the punitive damages issue in Hansen v. Harrah's, 675
P.2d 394 (Nev. 1984) (per curiam), was decided wrongly. In Hansen, the Supreme Court of
Nevada recognized a cause of action for wrongful discharge on the part of an employee
terminated for filing a workers' compensation claim. The court approved the use of punitive
damages in future cases but declined to impose them in this case because it would be inap-
propriate to punish the defendant for conduct he could not have known was actionable
beforehand.
189. 668 P.2d 213 (Mont. 1983).
190. Id. at 216.
191. Id.
192. Fincke v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 448 F. Supp. 187-91, (W.D. Pa. 1978); Yartzoff
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nitive damages will not lie in contract cases193 always has been sub-
ject to a number of exceptions. Traditionally, courts have imposed
punitive damages in cases involving breach of promise to marry,
breach of fiduciary duty, breach of duty by a public utility, breach
of contract accompanied by fraud, or breach of contract that con-
stitutes some independent tort.1 94
Current developments in contract law suggest the likelihood of
further erosion of the rule disallowing punitive damages in con-
tract cases.195 Courts have become more receptive in recent years
to the use of punitive damages in cases involving abuse of power in
contractual relationships, 9 " and this new willingness reflects
changing views about the responsibilities of those who wield a high
degree of economic power. One way of making punitive damages
available in such cases is by creating contractual duties that sound
in tort, thus expanding the independent tort exception. A majority
of states expanding the independent tort exception have imposed a
duty of good faith and fair dealing on insurance companies.19 7
Some courts have taken a more direct approach and have per-
mitted punitive damages in contract cases when public policy fa-
vors the use of a punitive remedy. In Vernon Fire & Casualty In-
surance v. Sharp,'98 the Supreme Court of Indiana held that
v. Democrat-Herald Publishing Co., Inc., 281 Or. 651, 576 P.2d 356, 360 n.1 (1978); Wood v.
Halmemann Medical College & Hosp., 1 Pa. D. & C.3d 674 (1976); see also Brockmeyer v.
Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wisc. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834, 841 (1983) (punitive damages would
be available in tort actions but that its public policy approach lay in contract, and no tort
actions could be maintained); cf. Fogleman v. Peruvian Assoc., 127 Ariz. 504, 622 P.2d 63, 65
(1980) (no punitive damages for breach of express contract of employment for two-year
term).
193. See, e.g., White v. Benkowski, 37 Wis. 2d 285, 290-92, 155 N.W.2d 74, 77 (1967);
Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480, 486 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); see also J. CALAMARI &
J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14-3 (2d ed. 1977); 5 A. Corbin, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 1077, at 438 (1964); 11 S. Williston, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1340 (W.
Jaeger 3d ed. 1968); Simpson, Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract, 20 OHIo ST. L.J.
284 (1959); see also Sullivan, supra note 5, at 221 (stating that it is not clear why punitive
damages were disallowed in contract cases).
194. For thorough discussions of the traditional exceptions to the rule that punitive dam-
ages were not recoverable in contract, see Sullivan, supra note 5, at 223-36, and Note, Puni-
tive Damages Exceptions, supra note 8, at 93-96.
195. See generally Note, Punitive Damages in Contract Cases, supra note 8.
196. Sullivan, supra note 5, at 248.
197. See J. McCARTHY, supra note 92, § 2.4, at 116.
198. 264 Ind. 599, 349 N.E.2d 173 (1976).
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punitive damages may be imposed in a contract case when "a seri-
ous wrong, tortious in nature, has been committed . . . [even
though] the wrong does not conveniently fit the confines of an in-
dependent tort"199 if it appears that "the public interest will be
served by the deterrent effect punitive damages will have upon fu-
ture conduct of the wrongdoer and parties similarly situated. '20 0
The Vernon approach has been used in contract cases outside of
the insurance context.20 1 For example, in Art Hill Ford, Inc. v. Cal-
lender,0 2 the Supreme Court of Indiana awarded punitive damages
against an automobile dealer who took six months to complete re-
paira on a new truck while ignoring the plaintiff's inquiries about
the status of the truck and falsely informing plaintiff that needed
parts were unavailable.20 3 In Jones v. Abriani,20 4 the Indiana Court
of Appeals for the First District affirmed a punitive damages award
against a mobile home dealer who sold a defective mobile home,
failed to repair it despite continued assurances, refused to refund
plaintiff's downpayment upon rejection, and concealed the limited
warranty until the warranty period had elapsed. 05
Although Vernon and its progeny currently represent a minority
approach, 0 6 that approach can be justified by the policies underly-
ing punitive damages. When the behavior of the breaching party
warrants punitive damages, an additional deterrent is needed in
contract cases even more than in tort cases because of the compar-
atively limited measure of compensatory damages recoverable in
contract cases. A defendant who can calculate in advance the ex-
tent of his liability will have little incentive not to breach when the
199. Id. at 608, 349 N.E.2d at 180.
200. Id.; accord Riverside Ins. Co. v. Pedigo, 430 N.E.2d 796, 804-05 (Ind. 1982); State
Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Clifton, 86 N.M. 757, 527 P.2d 798, 800 (1974). But see, e.g., Higgins
v. Blue Cross, 319 N.W.2d 232, 235 (Iowa 1982); Bliss v. Equitable Life, Assurance Soc'y,
620 F.2d 65, 68-69 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying Texas law).
201. See, e.g., Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979) (applying
Indiana law), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir.
1958); Whitfield Constr. Co. v. Commercial Dev. Corp., 392 F. Supp. 982 (D.V.I. 1975); Lou
Leventhal Auto Co. v. Munns, 164 Ind. App. 368, 328 N.E.2d 734, 742 (1975); Eakman v.
Robb, 237 N.W.2d 423 (N.D. 1975).
202. 423 N.E.2d 601 (Ind. 1981).
203. Id. at 604.
204. 169 Ind. App. 556, 350 N.E.2d 635 (1976).
205. Id. at - , 350 N.E.2d at 652.
206. See J. MCCARTHY, supra note 92, § 1.42, at 92-97.
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benefits to him of breaching far exceed the damages he will be re-
quired to pay. The compensatory function of punitive damages is
heightened in contract cases because intangible injuries such as
mental anguish would not otherwise be recoverable, and because
transactional expenses would have to be paid out of damages
awarded for actual pecuniary losses.
Naturally, punitive damages are not appropriate in every in-
stance of a breach of contract, just as it would be inappropriate to
impose punitive damages for every tort committed. Courts should
not, however, withhold punitive damages merely because the ac-
tion lies in contract if the defendant's conduct warrants punish-
ment and deterrence.
3. Punitive Damages Rejected as Unjustifiable
Generally, punitive damages are not available in actions brought
under federal labor laws, 0 7 including actions for wrongful dis-
charge of union members. 08 Courts have rejected punitive dam-
ages because they conflict with the remedial and conciliatory goals
of federal labor policy 20 1 and because they upset the balance of
power in labor relations that the statutes seek to protect.2 10 This
reasoning would not apply to actions by unorganized employees
who have no well-developed and legally recognized administrative
systems through which to assert their interests and no representa-
tive entity to prevent abuses.211 Moreover, some courts have held
that federal labor law does not preclude the institution of wrongful
discharge suits premised on state law.212 If state law permits,
207. Brotherhood of Ry. Carmen v. Delpro Co., 579 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Del. 1984). See
generally Shaller, The Availability of Punitive Damages in Breach of Contract Actions
Under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 219
(1982). But see Sidney Wanzer & Sons v. Milk Drivers Union, Local 753, 249 F. Supp. 664,
671 (N.D. IM. 1966).
208. See Holodnak v. Avco Corp. 514 F.2d 285, 291-93 (2d. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 892 (1975); Dian v. United Steelworkers of America, 486 F. Supp. 700, 706-07 (E.D. Pa.
1980).
209. See, e.g., Dian v. United Steelworkers of America, 486 F. Supp. 700, 703-04 (E.D. Pa.
1980). Contra Shaller, supra note 207, at 231.
210. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Ry Carmen v. Delpro Co., 579 F. Supp. 1332, 1335-36 (D.
Del. 1984).
211. See Brown v. World Airways, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 179, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
212. Peabody Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981); cf. Bertling v. Roadway
Express, 121 Ill. App. 3d 60, 459 N.E.2d 265, 268 (1984) (adverse arbitration decision pre-
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courts may impose punitive damages in such cases.213
Only one of the cases recognizing a tort cause of action for
wrongful discharge of at will employees has squarely rejected the
application of punitive damages. In Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat
Service, Inc.," 4 a seaman who suffered an ankle injury on a vessel
was discharged when his attorney notified his employer of his in-
tention to file a claim for personal injuries under the Jones Act.
Stating that "[t]he right to discharge at will should not be allowed
to bar the courthouse door, '215 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit recognized for the first time a cause of action
under maritime law for the intentional tort of retaliatory dis-
charge.216 The court made available a broad range of compensatory
damages.21 7 It stated, however, that the employer should not be
penalized further by the imposition of punitive damages, because
the additional deterrent that such damages would provide would
not justify their imposition. 218 Thus, although the balance of re-
spective rights weighed in favor of the seaman in the retaliatory
discharge action, the court believed that it weighed in favor of the
employer on the issue of punitive damages.219 While its rationale
for rejecting punitive damages is not articulated, the Jones court
apparently believed that it could accomplish without the threat of
punitive damages the objectives of the cause of action it recog-
nized, or at least that public policy favored limiting the risks of
wrongful discharge to the employer.
cludes maintenance of retaliatory discharge action on same factual basis); Wyatt v. Jewel
Comp. Inc., 108 Ill. App. 3d 840, 439 N.E.2d 1053 (1982) (employee not required to exhaust
remedies under collective bargaining agreement before asserting claim for tort of retaliatory
discharge); Thompson v. Monsanto Co., 559 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Cir. App. 1977) (same).
213. See Wyatt v. Jewell Cos., Inc., 108 IMI. App. 3d 840, 439 N.E.2d 1053 (1982); Carna-
tion Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450, 454-55 (Tex. 1980); Shaller, supra note 207, at 229 n.83.
214. 653 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1981).
215. Id. at 1062.
216. Id. at 1063.
217. The court stated that the plaintiff may recover expenses such as finding a new job,
lost earnings, lost future wages, and damages for mental anguish. Id. at 1064.
218. Id. at 1064.
219. Id.
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B. Justifications for the Use of Punitive Damages in Wrongful
Discharge Actions
To determine whether the use of punitive damages is justified,
one must return to the policies furthered by the creation of a cause
of action for wrongful discharge. Objectives of wrongful discharge
actions include protecting the public interest from interference
with important public policies, facilitating some individual expec-
tations, and policing unsavory conduct. Fundamentally, however,
the objective of these actions is to correct the imbalance of power
which results from the practical inability of unorganized employees
to bargain individually for job security. Courts probably would not
have undertaken the massive modifications of tort law and con-
tract principles that have made the creation of these rights of ac-
tion possible if they did not perceive unorganized employees as a
vulnerable group in need of the law's protection.
To a modest extent, then, courts are performing for at will em-
ployees the power-enhancing function that labor unions perform
for organized employees. Yet, courts are unwilling to prescribe a
"just cause" standard for discharge,22° probably because of concern
about the inefficiencies such a standard would engender. As a prac-
tical matter, courts are unable to prescribe a just cause standard
because they are ill-equipped for the avalanche of litigation that
would result from such a standard. They instead have created a
cluster of theories that modify the balance of power presently ex-
isting in the relationship between employers and unorganized em-
ployees without unduly stressing judicial resources.
Just as courts have awarded punitive damages to correct imbal-
ances of power in the context of insurance221 and product liability
cases,222 these damages also can be a useful means of deterring the
abuse of power in the employment context. Although there is no
empirical proof that the threat of punitive damages deters undesir-
able behavior,223 one can presume that the higher the risks of mis-
conduct, the more likely that persons contemplating such conduct,
220. Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 659, 669-70, 429 N.E.2d 21, 26 (1981).
221. See supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 7.
223. See Owen, Civil Punishment, supra note 5, at 111 (calling for an empirical study of
the deterrent effect of punitive damages).
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especially corporate defendants,224 will be deterred from engaging
in it.
If compensatory damages in a wrongful discharge case are rela-
tively small, an employer has little to lose by committing a wrong-
ful discharge. Likewise, in the absence of punitive damages, many
employees would gain little by instituting an action for compensa-
tion. Because of the need for deterrence, it is in the public interest
to encourage meritorious litigation instituted by private individu-
als. The need for the extra measure of deterrence and the incentive
for private enforcement provided by punitive damages is even
more compelling in jurisdictions that limit compensatory remedies
to reinstatement and back pay, particularly when an employer's
action contravenes some strong, independent public policy. Courts
should not expect the employee, who is in a highly vulnerable posi-
tion, to protect the public interest by, for example, resisting an
employer's request to commit a crime on pain of loss of employ-
ment. Instead, the courts should assume responsibility for discour-
aging violations of public policy.
The absence of an administrative framework for resolving dis-
putes in wrongful discharge cases and the corresponding need to
conserve judicial resources makes it desirable for courts to employ
a remedy designed to prevent future incidents of wrongful dis-
charge. The prevention of wrongful discharge is especially impor-
tant because at will employees in lower-paying positions who have
little opportunity for advancement are less likely to resort to the
legal system for a remedy than are at will employees in middle and
upper management positions.225 The imposition of a punitive rem-
edy also can be a strong and justifiable statement of moral disap-
proval of a defendant's abuse of his power.
Finally, punitive damages serve a compensatory function in
wrongful discharge cases. In jurisdictions that limit compensatory
remedies to back pay and reinstatement, the assessment of puni-
tive damages serves to compensate deserving plaintiffs for intangi-
ble but nonetheless real injuries such as mental anguish and loss of
status or professional reputation that attend discharge from em-
224. See id. at 107.
225. See Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public
Policy Exception, 96 HAv. L. REv. 1931, 1042-45 (1983).
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ployment. Even in jurisdictions that permit a full panoply of tort
remedies, some harmful effects of wrongful discharge, such as so-
cial stigma and loss of identification, status and marketability, 22
could remain unremedied. Moreover, even a plaintiff awarded a
full measure of compensatory damages would not be made truly
whole because she would not be compensated for transactional ex-
penses such as attorney's fees.
The purposes underlying the doctrine of punitive damages are
served by the use of punitive damages in appropriate wrongful dis-
charge cases. They enhance the admonitory force of wrongful dis-
charge actions, thus facilitating the objectives that militated for
the creation of such actions.
C. Dangers to be Avoided in the Use of a Punitive Remedy
Punitive damages are not appropriate in all successful wrongful
discharge actions, nor should they be applied in an unrestrained
manner. Courts must avoid several dangers in fashioning and ad-
ministering a punitive remedy.
First, if the deterrence to wrongful discharge is too great, em-
ployers may be chilled in the exercise of legitimate authority over
the workplace. Fearing liability for damages, they may elect to re-
tain an employee whose performance is substandard. Such a result
would redound to the detriment of the employer, the morale of the
workplace, and ultimately the consuming public. Deterrence would
be too great if employers were unable to determine in advance
what conduct would give rise to punitive damages, if punitive dam-
ages were used in an unprincipled manner, or if trial judges did not
exercise close supervision over the calculation of the punitive dam-
ages award. The danger of overdeterrence especially would be great
if punitive damages were imposed in the cases involving violations
of ill-defined public or private interests.
A second danger lies in the intense hostility that an employer is
likely to encounter from jurors. If the use of punitive damages is
not closely supervised, jurors acting out of passion and prejudice
.may return extraordinary verdicts against defendant-employers.
Bifurcated trials, in which questions of liability and punishment
226. See Blades, supra note 12, at 1413-14 (discussing the emotional repercussions of loss
of employment).
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would be separated,227 and the exercise of close scrutiny in the im-
position of punitive damages could lessen this danger.
A third danger involves the application of punitive damages to
employers with few employees. 228 These employers likely are less
sophisticated about the nascent rights of employees, and thus are
more likely to commit legal mistakes. Moreover, employers with
few employees do not enjoy the bargaining power over at will em-
ployees that large corporate employers experience. Finally, litiga-
tion expenses or excessive punitive damages awards might cripple
small employers because they have less ability than a larger em-
ployer to absorb and redistribute the costs. Courts could avoid the
danger of imposing excessive or undue liability on small employers
by considering the size of the employer as a factor in mitigation of
punitive damages.
Courts can address these concerns by the manner in which they
formulate and administer the punitive remedy in wrongful dis-
charge cases. Clear definition of the circumstances warranting pu-
nitive damages and procedures that protect employers from un-
principled use of the remedy can avoid the dangers discussed
above while still furthering the purposes for which punitive dam-
ages were designed.
D. What Conduct Should Warrant the Imposition of Punitive
Damages?
In defining the range of conduct that gives rise to an award of
punitive damages in wrongful discharge cases, courts must balance
the risks discussed above against the objectives of both the puni-
tive remedy and the wrongful discharge action. To avoid the risk of
chilling legitimate personnel decisions, courts should limit punitive
damages to cases in which the employer has some means of appre-
ciating that his conduct is wrongful. Notice of the wrongfulness of
a contemplated discharge could be supplied by a statute or deci-
sion outlawing discharge for a specified reason. Notice also could
be found in commonly held moral or legal principles or in the ap-
227. See supra note 140.
228. See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 192, 384 N.E.2d 353, 362 (1978) (Under-
wood, J., dissenting); Lally v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J. Super. 162, 183, 413 A.2d 960, 970
(1980) (Antell, J.A.D., dissenting), afl'd, 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981).
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preciation of a clear and specific right held by the plaintiff that is
established by law or contract.
Where there is a reasonable doubt about the extent of the em-
ployee's right, courts should resolve these doubts in favor of the
employer on the punitive damage issue. For example, while em-
ployees may have certain personal freedoms of speech and associa-
tion, the extent of these rights are ill-defined. An employer who
discharges an employee for objecting to a product or policy of the
employer may be liable for compensatory damages if state law per-
mits but should not be subjected to punitive damages. By contrast,
an employer aware of a definite right or obligation on the part of
the employee should be expected to appreciate the wrongfulness of
interference with that right or duty. Thus, an employer who dis-
charges an employee for refusing to commit a crime has notice, de-
rived from general moral principles and common knowledge that
all persons have the obligation not to violate the criminal law, that
the discharge is wrongful. The threshold inquiry should be, then,
whether the employer had the means of appreciating that its con-
duct was wrongful. This test would exclude punitive damages in
cases involving violations of personal rights that are not clearly es-
tablished, such as most implied-in-fact contract cases and cases us-
ing the more attenuated definition of public policy, which occur
without additional personal misconduct of the employer.
Second, in view of the retributive aspect of punitive damages
and the danger of exposure to excessive liability, courts should re-
serve the use of punitive damages for cases involving an element of
outrage or aggravated misconduct. These courts could use the
state-of-mind test to identify the type of aggravated misconduct
warranting punishment, but should be mindful that outrage may
also be present in conduct that offers an unjustifiable insult to the
public interest. Two basic categories of cases can be identified in
which courts could justifiably find that the employer's conduct was
an extreme deviation from its obligation and, therefore, deserving
of punishment.
1. Reprehensible Behavior Toward an Individual Employee
In Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmont,2 9 the Supreme
229. 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
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Court of West Virginia held that an employee discharged because
of his efforts to bring the employer into compliance with certain
federal and state banking laws stated a cause of action. ' ° Follow-
ing this decision, the trial court awarded the employee $62,500 in
punitive damages.2"' On appeal from the punitive damages award,
the court held that punitive damages were not justified because the
facts did not demonstrate willful, malicious, or wanton conduct." 2
The court held that punitive damages are appropriate if the em-
ployer circulated false rumors about the employee, engaged in con-
certed efforts of harassment to induce the employee to resign, or
actively interfered with the employee's efforts to find other em-
ployment. 33 Conversely, in Gates,3 4 the employer's deceptive con-
duct in inducing the employee to resign gave rise to punitive
damages."3
Thus, the necessary element of outrage can exist in conduct in-
dependent of the decision to discharge, when the employer inflicts
gratuitous and unnecessary harm on the employee, adding insult to
injury, or when the employer overreaches acceptable boundaries to
accomplish a desired goal. The use of punitive damages in such
cases fits neatly into the traditional pattern of employing punitive
damages in cases involving dignitary torts. When one offers an ex-
treme and unnecessary insult to one in a vulnerable position, pun-
ishment and deterrence are justified.
Courts should not limit punitive damages to incidents in which
employers have maliciously or callously mistreated employees,
however. Because the two most prevalent theories of wrongful dis-
charge are designed for the protection of the public interest, courts
should examine the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct in re-
lation to the public interest or a clear private interest.
230. Id. at 277.
231. Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 289 S.E.2d 692, 695 (W. Va. 1982).
232. Id. at 703.
233. Id. at 703 n.19.
234. Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 668 P.2d 213 (Mont. 1983); see supra notes 189-91
and accompanying text.
235. Id. at 216.
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2. Outrageous Conduct in Relation to a Strong Public Interest
or a Clear Personal Right
When an employer violates a strong public interest with con-
scious indifference of the consequences, its conduct is outrageous
in a different sense. Society grants to those persons engaged in
business a wide range of benefits, such as the right to operate in
the corporate form, the right to engage in professional or other reg-
ulated practices, and indeed, the right to discharge employees at
will. It has the corresponding right to expect that the power thus
acquired will not be used to gain an end that would flout a strong
public interest. In determining the culpability of the defendant's
conduct, courts should consider the defendant's state of mind to-
ward the public interest as well as the defendant's state of mind
toward the plaintiff. An employer who uses the power to terminate
in wanton disregard of a strong public interest of which he is or
should be aware has committed an outrage sufficient to warrant
punishment and deterrence. This type of forbidden conduct goes
to the reasons for termination rather than to the manner in which
the termination is accomplished. The best example of this type of
conduct exists when an employer discharges an employee for refus-
ing to commit a crime. The interests of the employee are clearly
affected in such cases, but the greater threat is to the public
interest.
Similarly, courts can find the requisite culpability to support an
assessment of punitive damages in the use of the power of termina-
tion to inhibit or retaliate for the exercise of a clearly defined right.
In such circumstances, courts can conclude that the employer acts
in conscious disregard of the harm threatened to the plaintiff and
other employees. The need for deterrence in such cases is espe-
cially strong because, absent the threat of a stern civil sanction,
the employer's conduct may become an insidious pattern adversely
affecting the rights of other employees as well as the public inter-
est. Courts, then, can appropriately consider the actor's purposes
and state of mind toward all affected parties.
CONCLUSION
The development of rights of action for wrongfully discharged at
will employees reflects the general trend toward increasing the ac-
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countability of those who possess power over the lives of others.
Courts have recognized that some uses of the power of termination
adversely affect important public policies and that at will employ-
ees lack the political and bargaining power to curb even the most
flagrant abuses of the power of termination.230 Yet, the fragmenta-
tion that characterizes American employment law in general '37 also
pervades the expanding body of law regarding termination of at
will employees. The crazy-quilt of theories and approaches for re-
covery by at will employees signifies a war of policies in which the
need to enlarge the power of unorganized workers is pitted against
the need to conserve judicial resources and the need to retain busi-
ness owners' ultimate control of the workplace. Courts have re-
solved this conflict by creating outer limits on the power of termi-
nation, in which only employees who have been the victims of
exceptional abuses are compensated.
An employer has little incentive to respect these newly created
rights, however, when abusive discharge will result in isolated liti-
gation by individuals who may recover only relatively small sums
in compensatory damages. The use of punitive damages in appro-
priate wrongful discharge cases expresses society's disapproval of
the exploitation of superior power and creates a strong incentive
for employers to conform to newly created legal duties. As in other
types of cases in which courts have imposed punitive damages to
enforce society's expectations regarding the legitimate use of
power, a remedy that provokes the attention of people in the boar-
droom and the personnel office is needed in wrongful discharge
cases to halt abusive employment practices that threaten public
and private interests.
236. See Blades, supra note 12, at 1433-34 (noting that legislative reform is unlikely be-
cause there is no strong lobby to promote it and because employers and labor unions would
be likely to oppose general statutory limitations on the power of termination).
237. See P. SELZNICK, supra note 20, at 121 (noting the "curious bifurcation between the
law of employment and labor law" and observing that "[tihere is no integrated 'law of
employment' ").
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